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REFUGEE RIGHTS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE
JAMES C. HATHAWAY* AND ANNE K. CUSICK**

America's troubled relationship with international law, in particular human rights law, is well documented.' In many cases, the United States simply
will not agree to be bound by international human rights treaties. For
example, the United States has yet to ratify even such fundamental agreements as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,2 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 3 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.4
When the United States does agree to become a party to an international
human rights treaty, it has often sought to condition its acceptance of
international obligations on the supremacy of its domestic constitution.5 In
the view of most other governments and experts, this kind of highly qualified
ratification of human rights treaties may not be substantive ratification at all;
after all, the whole point of international law is for states to agree to bring

* Professor of Law and Director, Program in Refugee and Asylum Law, The University of Michigan.
The helpful comments of Deborah Anker of Harvard Law School, and of the participants at the
Georgetown University Law Center Workshop on the Supreme Court and Immigration and Refugee Law,
are acknowledged with appreciation. Portions of the analysis which follows are based on the current
working draft of James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees underInternationalLaw. Copyright © 2000
James C. Hathaway.
** A.B. (Stanford), M.A. (Johns Hopkins S.A.I.S.), J.D. (Michigan).
1. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 65 (1990) ("In the process that achieved the
universalization and intemationalization of human rights, the United States has played a major part. Yet
the significance of international human rights in the policy of the United States has hardly been understood
either abroad or at home, and indeed it has been riddled with apparent contradictions.").
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. Doc.
No. 95-2 (1977), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. This treaty was signed by the United States on October 5, 1977, but has
not been ratified.
3. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33. This treaty was signed by the United States on July 17, 1980, but
has not been ratified.
4. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448. This treaty was
signed by the United States on Feb. 16, 1995, but has not been ratified.
5. In the case of [the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination] the Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations which the Senate attached to United States accession have
reflected certain assumptions or 'principles,' namely that no treaty obligations should be undertaken that
are inconsistent with the [U.S.] Constitution; ratification should effect no change to United States law or
practice where it fell below international standards; treaties should be non-self-executing; and implementation should be by states except for areas within the competence of the federal authorities.
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their domestic
laws into compliance with international standards, not the
6
reverse.
Third, the United States routinely refuses to condone the enforceability of
whatever highly conditioned international human rights obligations it accepts. In part it achieves this goal by reliance on an extraordinarily fungible
notion that most international rights are not "self-executing,", 7 in consequence of which American courts are precluded from implementing them.
Additionally, the United States refuses to allow its own citizens the right to
access United Nations individuated complaint mechanisms, including those
established to adjudicate civil and political rights, racial discrimination, and
freedom from torture.8 In refusing such access, the United States sadly denies
to Americans rights held by the citizens of even less democratic countries
like Algeria, China, and Libya.
The commitment of the United States to international refugee law should
logically stand out as a positive exception to this tale of international
apostasy. The United States is a party to the Protocol relating to the Status of

6. As per General Comment No. 24(52), U.N. Human Rights Committee, 52nd Sess., 1382nd mtg.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2I /Rev.l/Add.6 (1994):
Reservations must be specific and transparent, so that the Committee, those under the jurisdiction
of the reserving State and other State parties may be clear as to what obligations of human rights
compliance have or have not been undertaken. Reservations may thus not be general, but must
refer to a particular provision of the Covenant and indicate in precise terms its scope in relation
thereto. When considering the compatibility of possible reservations with the object and purpose
of the Covenant, States should also take into consideration the overall effect of a group of
reservations, as well as the effect of each reservation on the integrity of the Covenant, which
remains an essential consideration. States should not enter so many reservations that they are in
effect accepting a limited number of human rights obligations, and not the Covenant as such. So
that reservations do not lead to a perpetual non-attainment of international human rights standards,
reservations should not systematically reduce the obligations undertaken only to those presently
existing in less demanding standards of domestic law. Nor should interpretative declarations or
reservations seek to remove an autonomous meaning to Covenant obligations, by pronouncing
them to be identical, or to be accepted only in so far as they are identical, with existing provisions
of domestic law. States should not seek through reservations or interpretative declarations to
determine that the meaning of a provision of the Covenant is the same as that given by an organ of
any other international treaty body.
7.

As first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Fosterv. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829),

[olur Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is ...equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
8. The United States is not a party to the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which establishes an individual right of petition to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee in respect of breaches of the Covenant. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adoptedDec. 16, 1966, art. 2,999 U.N.T.S. 302, 6 .L.M. 383. Nor has it agreed
to either Article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination nor Article 22 of the
Convention Against Torture, each of which similarly authorizes a right of individual petition in relation to
the rights guaranteed by those treaties. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Jan. 7, 1966, art. 14, 5 I.L.M. 352, 361-62; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 22, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1035
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
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Refugees, 9 which incorporates by reference both the definition of a refugee
and a catalogue of refugee rights derived from the earlier Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees.' 0 In acceding to the Protocol, the United States
moreover made only two, quite modest reservations relating to rights of
taxation and the duty to extend social security benefits to refugees." No
attempt whatsoever was made to condition ratification on compatibility with
American domestic law, including the Constitution.1 2 And it is absolutely
clear that the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980' 3 was intended to
implement American obligations under the Protocol. Yet the fact remains
that the American asylum system is one of the most parochial in the world.
One consequence of this isolation from the broader refugee law community is an impoverished understanding of refugee law in the United States.
While there are more than 130 nations bound by precisely the same refugee
law obligations as the United States, American decision-makers only rarely
show any awareness of the ways in which even these countries' highest
courts have implemented the Convention and Protocol. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's most recent refugee decision in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre'5 contains the
first reference by the Court to the jurisprudence of another state party to the

9. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter Protocol]. Pursuant to Art. I(1) of the Protocol, "[t]he States Parties to the present Protocol
undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined." Id. at
606 U.N.T.S. 268.
10. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
Convention].
11. Specifically,
The United States of America construes Article 29 of the Convention as applying only to refugees
who are resident in the United States and reserves the right to tax refugees who are not residents of
the United States in accordance with its general rules relating to non-resident aliens ... The United
States of America accepts the obligation of paragraph I (b) of Article 24 of the Convention except
insofar as that paragraph may conflict in certain instances with any provisions of title H (old age,
survivors' and disability insurance) or title XVIII (hospital and medical insurance for the aged) of
the Social Security Act. As to any such provision, the United States will accord to refugees
lawfully staying in its territory treatment no less favorable than is accorded aliens generally in the
same circumstances.
19 U.S.T. 6223, 6257 (reservation deposited by the Government of the United States upon ratification of
the Protocol).
12. "In 1968 the United States acceded to the United Nations Protocol .... The Protocol bound
parties to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations
Convention ... with respect to 'refugees' as defined in Article 1(2) of the Protocol." INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407,416 (1984).
13. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
14. "If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the
entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into
conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol [r]elating to the Status of Refugees ....
INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987). As Joan Fitzpatrick has observed, "the legislative history of
the Refugee Act is replete with general expressions of intent to bring U.S. law into conformity with
international norms." Joan Fitzpatrick, The InternationalDimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (1997); see also Carolyn P. Blum, A Question of Values: Continuing Divergences Between
U.S. and InternationalRefugee Norms, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 38 (1997); Scott Busby, The Politics of
Protection: Limits and Possibilitiesin the Implementation of InternationalRefugee Norms in the United
States, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 27 (1997). See generally infra notes 144-48.

15.

INS v.Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439(1999).
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Convention and Protocol as support for its reasoning. 16 In contrast, the top7
courts in other leading common law countries, including those of Australia, '
Canada,' 8 and the United Kingdom,' 9 routinely draw on the thinking of
judges in other countries before determining refugee status and adjudicating
the content of refugee rights. A commitment to treat similarly situated asylum
seekers comparably in each state party makes ethical good sense and
provides decision-makers with a practical means of profiting from a broader
range of experience. By refusing to look to caselaw from outside its own
borders, the American refugee jurisprudence is strikingly anomalous.2 °
As important as this substantive critique is, we wish to focus here on a
more subtle, but quite fundamental, way in which the United States has
distanced itself from full compliance with international refugee law. The
uniquely American protection system rejects the most basic premise of the
international refugee regime, namely that all persons who meet the refugee
definition are entitled to benefit from internationally established rights. The
legacy of the foundational jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court has been
illegitimately to substitute access to discretion for entitlement to rights.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF REFUGEE RIGHTS

The essential theory underlying the Refugee Convention is a simple one:
persons who are in fact refugees, even prior to formal recognition as such, 2 '
16. In correctly rejecting the argument that an applicant for protection can be excluded under Art.
l(F)(b) only if the gravity of his crimes outweighs the seriousness of the persecution feared, the Court
cited the 1996 House of Lords decision of T v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 All E.R.
865, 882 (H.L. 1996). The Supreme Court rejected the so-called "balancing test," finding comfort in Lord
Mustill's common sense observation that "[t]he crime either is or is not political when committed, and its
character cannot depend on the consequences which the offender may afterwards suffer if returned."
Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. at 1447.
17. InApplicantA v. Ministerfor Immigrationand EthnicAffairs (1997) 142 A.L.R. 331 (Austl.), the
Australian High Court referred to both U.S. and Canadian caselaw as well as four pertinent international
treaties in construing the application of the "particular social group" category to persons at risk of
sterilization for violation of China's one-child-family policy.
18. In Pushpanathanv. Minister of Employment and Immigration, No. 25173, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct.
LEXIS 29 (June 4, 1998), the Canadian Supreme Court invoked two decisions of the International Court
of Justice, and relied on twelve international treaties to inform its interpretation of Article l(F)(c) of the
Convention, pursuant to which persons reasonably believed to have acted contrary to the principles and
purposes of the United Nations are excluded from refugee status.
19. In Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 W.L.R. 1015 (H.L. 1999), the House of
Lords considered caselaw from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States as well as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in considering whether
women from Pakistan should be deemed a "particular social group" for purposes of the Refugee
Convention.
20. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (insisting that refugees are to be denied
protection unless somehow able to prove the state of mind of the person or entity that would persecute
them); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (misstating the duty of non-refoulement
that encourages states to avoid their duties towards refugees by arm's-length deterrent practices).
21. The UNHCR advises that
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria
contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee
status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a
refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is
recognized because he is a refugee.
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are the holders of rights that may be invoked in relation to any state party. 22
All persons who meet the Convention refugee definition are entitled to the
same catalogue of rights, namely those stipulated in Articles 2 through 34 of
the Convention. The reason to both define and adjudicate refugee status is to
identify those persons who are entitled to claim the Convention's list of basic
guarantees.
To be clear, persons who meet the Convention definition of a refugee are
not entitled to "asylum," understood in the sense of permanent admission to
a state party.2 3 The drafters of the Convention were adamant that they were
not engaged in an effort to constrain state authority over permanent entry of
non-citizens. 2 4 The issue of immigration was left entirely to state discretion,
with Article 34 codifying what amounts to no more than a duty of states to
give sympathetic consideration to the naturalization of refugees. The quid
pro quo for the recognition of fulsome state discretion over the granting of
asylum, however, was a clear and uncompromising duty to extend a broadranging set of rights to all refugees under one's jurisdiction. Socioeconomic
rights are emphasized in order to ensure that refugees are able quickly to
become self-sufficient in their country of refuge. On a plain reading of the
text, these are not standards of achievement, but rights enforceable against
state parties stated in the language of legal obligation. 5
The Supreme Court's first decisions after accession by the United States to
the Refugee Protocol arrived at a nearly opposite understanding. Read
together, the judgments in Stevic 2 6 and Cardoza-Fonseca2 7 determined that
there is really only one clear obligation owed under the Refugee Convention,
namely Article 33's duty of non-refoulement. Yet in the Supreme Court's
view not even this duty is owed to persons who meet the Convention's
definition of a refugee, but only to a subset of super-refugees able to show a

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER

FOR

REFUGEES

(UNHCR),

HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES

AND

CRrrERiA FOR DErERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 28 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].

22. See infra Part II.
23. The attempt to draft a Convention on Territorial Asylum resulted in failure. See ATLE GRAHLMADSEN, TERRTrrORAL ASYLUM (1980). While Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
does provide for "the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution," this
provision is not of binding force. UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N.
GAOR, 183rd mtg. at 74, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
24. See, for example, the statement of the French representative:
To admit without any reservation that a refugee who had settled temporarily in a receiving country
was free to enter another, would be to grant him a right of immigration which might be exercised
for reasons of mere personal convenience. It was normal in such cases that he should apply for a
visa to the authorities of the country in question.
Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and StatelessPersons:Summary Record of the
FourteenthMeeting, U.N. GAOR, 14th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR. 14 (1951) (statement of Mr.
Colemar of France).
25. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
26. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (i984).
27. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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probability of persecution in their country of origin. Persons able simply to
meet the Convention's requirement of having a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted ' 2 8 (correctly defined by the Supreme Court to require only a
"reasonable possibility" of persecution 29) are not ights-holders at all. They
may simply appeal to the Attorney-General to grant asylum in her discretion.
These decisions obviate fundamental duties under international refugee
law. Misinterpreting Article 33, the Court held that there is an obligation to
avoid refoulement, but it is not a duty owed to refugees qua refugees. And
relying on the flimsiest of all duties in the Convention, namely Article 34's
stipulation that states should"

. . . as
30

far as possible facilitate the assimilation

and naturalization of refugees,"- the Court reduced the duty to protect
refugees to no more than an obligation to consider an act of charity.
Somehow, Articles 2 through 32 of the Refugee Convention disappeared into
thin air.3 '
The practical ramifications of this mistaken de-linkage of refugee status
and refugee rights were initially few. Against the backdrop of the clarification
in Cardoza-Fonsecathat the lower, internationally correct "well-founded
fear of persecution" standard of proof governs applications for asylum,
restrictions on the negative exercise of discretion to grant asylum set by the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"')32 meant that nearly every "refugee"
was granted asylum under U.S. domestic law. 3 3 Because persons granted
asylum are entitled to apply for permanent residence in the United States
after one year,34 in practice refugees nearly always received full Convention
rights.35

28. Convention, supra note 10, at 152 (art. l(A)(2)).
29. The Supreme Court found that "[o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event
happening when there is less than a fifty percent chance of the occurrence taking place." CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. at 431. The Court clarified the import of the "reasonable possibility" test by insisting
that "[tihere is simply no room in the United Nations' definition for concluding that because an applicant
only has a 10 [percent] chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no
'well-founded fear' of the event happening." Id. at 440.
30. Convention, supra note 10, at 176 (art. 34).
31. There is a footnote in the Stevic decision which recognizes the potential relevance of Article 32(1)
of the Convention, which constrains the ability of a state to expel a refugee lawfully in its territory. Stevic,
467 U.S. at 417 n. 10. The balance of the judgment and the decision in Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421,
however, do nothing to give practical effect to this momentary acknowledgment of additional refugee
ights under international law.
32. See In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (BIA 1987) ("In the absence of any adverse factors,
however, asylum should be granted in the exercise of discretion."). But " ... Matter of Pula was decided
before the adoption of the regulations which now control both mandatory and discretionary denials of
asylum .... Matter of Pula was the BIA's 'attempt to fill a gap left in INS regulations,'.., a gap that has
now been filled by the subsequent action of the INS." Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999).
33. Soon after Cardoza-Fonseca,however, a pattern emerged whereby asylum claims were denied
not on grounds of discretion or lack of credibility, but on a narrow interpretation of the concept of
persecution and political opinion. See Deborah Anker & Carolyn Patty Blum, New Trends in Asylum
Jurisprudence:The Aftermath of the U.S. Supreme CourtDecision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 1 INT'L J.
REF. L. 67, 69-70 (1989).
34. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (Supp. III 1998).
35. Even after passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-193, § 400, 110 Stat. 2260, refugees and asylees were exempted from sweeping
restrictions imposed on access to public benefits imposed on other immigrants who failed to meet stringent
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More recently, however, the implicit ability of U.S. asylum law to counter
the de-linkage of refugee status and refugee rights has broken down. In 1996,
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") 36 was amended 37 to establish
statutory bars to the granting of asylum for reasons not authorized by the
Refugee Convention. Further, the Attorney General is granted the continuing authority to define additional grounds for the refusal of asylum. 38 If
these bars were simply restrictions on access to "asylum" defined in the
sense of a right to permanent residence in the United States, they would be
legally unexceptional (since, in accordance with Article 34 of the Convention, there is no duty to grant refugees a right to assimilate or to
naturalize). The international legal concern arises from the fact that the
United States impliedly relies on the asylum system to deliver the rights
owed to refugees under international law. Notwithstanding the erroneous
holdings in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca which denied that refugees are
rights-holders, the United States has been able to avoid violating international law because refugees in practice received asylum; and asylum
in practice delivered Convention rights. With the imposition of bars on
access to asylum (and indeed, even on the duty to withhold the deportation
of super-refugees) for reasons not contemplated by international law, the'
United States has now severed this automatic, if indirect, means of granting refugee rights to all refugees. Because there is no longer a dependable mechanism to offset the decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca,
persons who are in fact Convention refugees, but who fall under a statutory
bar to the granting of asylum, will be denied access to their Convention
rights.
In our view, the legislative record of accession to the United Nations
Refugee Protocol and adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980 shows that both
the Executive and Congress intended the United States to be bound by
international refugee law norms. While some Executive representations were
overstated, and while Congress did not legislate with precision, the text of the
Refugee Act considered by the Supreme Court in Stevic and CardozaFonseca could readily have been interpreted to implement the obligations of
the United States under the Refugee Protocol. There was no solid reason not
to have done so. To the contrary, respect for established canons of interpretation would have led the Court to adopt an understanding of U.S. law that was
in harmony with the structure of international refugee law.

residency requirements. Id. at § 402(a)(2)(A). Non-resident aliens are accorded the protection of the Bill
of Rights, which indirectly provides access to many Refugee Convention rights. See generally, David A.
Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: PoliticalAsylum and Beyond, 44 U.

Prrr. L. REv. 165, 177-78 (1983).
36. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
37. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
38. See INA § 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. 111997).
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Our analysis below aims to show how the substitution by the United States
Supreme Court of discretion for entitlement is irreconcilable to our treaty
obligations, in that it creates protection gaps which expose genuine Convention refugees to both the risk of refoulement and, more generally, to treatment
below international norms. We first consider the nature of the relationship
between refugee status and refugee rights as structured under international
law. We next review the history of U.S. accession to the Protocol in 1968 and
of the adoption of the Refugee Act in 1980, which we believe signals the
commitment in principle of Congress to a linkage between refugee status and
refugee rights as conceived under international law. This conclusion leads us
critically to appraise the contrary reasoning of the Supreme Court in Stevic
and Cardoza-Fonseca,decisions that provide a legal rationalization for the
imposition of bars on access to asylum and withholding of deportation which
put the United States squarely in breach of its legal obligations towards
refugees.
II.

REFUGEE RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

There are at least three reasons to recognize that refugees-that is, persons

who in fact meet the definition of a "refugee" stipulated in Article l(A)(2) of
the Refugee Convention-are entitled to claim the benefit of the rights
articulated in Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. First, the intention of
the treaty to establish a legal obligation to afford rights to refugees is clear
from the literal text and structure of the Convention itself. The goal of the
Convention was "... . to revise and consolidate previous international agree-

ments relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope and protection
accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement.", 39 State parties
"[h]ave agreed ' 40 to a non-derogable definition of a "refugee,", 41 and to
"apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination
.. ,,42 The duties owed to refugees by state parties are all stated in mandatory
are the holders
("shall") language. On the plain meaning of the text, refugees
43
of rights exercisable in relation to state parties to the treaty.
The non-discretionary nature of refugee rights is also clear from the
decision strictly to delimit the circumstances in which states may deviate
from the duties set by the Refugee Convention. The drafters of the Convention considered-but rejected-an all-embracing power of derogation in

39. Convention, supra note 10, at 150 (Preamble, 3).
40. Id. at 152 (Preamble, 1 6).
41. Id. at 152-54 (art. I(A)), 182 (art. 42(1)).
42. Id. at 156 (art. 3).
43. "....[Tihis 'ordinary meaning' does not necessarily result from a pure grammatical analysis. The
true meaning has to be arrived at by taking into account all the consequences which normally and
reasonably flow from the text." IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TiEAnEs 121

(1984).
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time of national crisis. a In particular, the British proponent of the derogation
clause wanted governments to be in a position to withhold rights from
refugees if faced with a mass influx during wartime or other crisis. Because it
would be impossible immediately to verify whether each person should be
excluded from refugee status on security grounds,45 governments might
otherwise be effectively compelled to grant rights to persons who represented
a danger to the host state.4 6 His concern was valid, since a significant number
of rights accrue to refugees even before their status has been formally
determined. 47 Yet, as the American delegate insisted, it was equally important that any exception to the duties owed refugees be limited to "very
special cases.",4 8 A balance was achieved between these two concerns in the
design of Article 9 of the Refugee Convention, which allows governments to
suspend refugee rights only when faced with a critical and exceptional crisis
and only on an interim basis, allowing them time to investigate particular
49
claims to refugee status.
44. "A contracting State may at a time of national crisis derogate from any particular provision of this
Convention to such extent only as is necessary in the interests of national security." United Kingdom:
Amendments to Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (E11618), U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc
Comm. on Refugees and Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.41 (1950).
45. Convention, supra note 10, at 156 (art. I(F)). The exclusion clauses, which form an integral part
of the definition of refugee status, also provide critical safeguards for governments. On this topic, see
generally ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 262-304 (1966);
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 214-33 (1991).

46.

The British representative

recalled the critical days of May and June 1940, when the United Kingdom had found itself in a
most hazardous position; any of the refugees within its borders might have been fifth columnists,
masquerading as refugees, and it could not afford to take chances with them. It was not impossible
that such a situation could be reproduced in the future.
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 21st mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.21 (1950) (statement of Sir Leslie Brass); see also U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on
Refugees & Stateless Persons, 34th mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.34 (1950) (statement of Mr.
Theodoli of Italy) (".. . [T]he main concern was to know whether at a time of crisis the Contracting States
could resort to exceptional measures. He referred to the situation of Italy at the outset of the war when
thousands of refugees had flocked to the frontiers of Italy.").
47. The assurance of the representative of the United States that "the doubts of the United Kingdom
representative might be resolved by the fact that any Government would be free to hold that any individual
was not a bonafide refugee, in which case none of the provisions of the convention would apply to him"
failed to recognize this critical point. U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems,
21 st mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. EIAC.32/SR.21 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States); see also
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 34th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. EIAC.32/
SR.34 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States).
48. U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 34th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.34 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States). In particular, Mr. Henkin agreed
that the Convention "ought not to prevent Governments in time of war from screening refugees to weed
out those who were posing as such for subversive purposes." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees
& Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 35th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.35 (1950). His concern was simply
that "any limitation ... ought to be defined more precisely than had been proposed, rather than leaving it
open to countries to make far-reaching reservations. He would like the limitation to be as narrow as was
possible ....
"Id.
49. The president of the conference recalled that
there had been no doubt that dangerous persons, such as spies, had to be dealt with under national
laws. The question had then been raised as to the action to be taken in respect of refugees on the
declaration of a state of war between two countries, which would make it impossible for a
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Thus, state parties may withhold rights from refugees "in time of war or
other grave and exceptional circumstances." Serious economic difficulties do
not warrant a suspension of rights.50 Nor is it sufficient for a government to
invoke "public order" concerns,5" or even "national security" interests.52
While the original formulation, in which governments could suspend rights
only during a "national emergency" was ultimately softened,5 3 more than
' 54 is clearly required. The circumstances must truly be
just "grave tension
"exceptional.", 55
Most important, Article 9 does not authorize generalized derogation on an
ongoing basis, but only as a provisional measure.5 a A state that wishes to

particular State to make an immediate distinction between enemy nationals, in the country,
supporting the enemy government, and those persons who had fled from the territory of that enemy
country. The Ad Hoc Committee had come to the conclusion that, while a government should not
be in a position to treat persons in the latter category as enemies, itwould need time to screen them.
Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. GAOR, 6th mtg. at
15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.6 (1951) (statement of The President, Mr. Larsen).
50. U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 34th mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.34 (1950) (statement of Mr. Robinson of Israel).
51. A suggestion to adopt this traditional formulation made by Mr. Perez Perozo of Venezuela was not
taken up by the drafters. U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 35th mtg. at 10,
U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.35 (1950).
52. This language was suggested by Mr. Shaw of Australia. Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the
Status of Refugees and StatelessPersons:Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 6th mtg. at
13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.6 (1951). It was, however, " ... felt that there might be reasonable grounds
for objecting to the Australian proposal that the phrase 'or in the interests of national security' should be
inserted, since it would enable a State to take exceptional measures at any time, and not only in time of war
of a national emergency." Id. at 14 (statement of Mr. Hoare of the United Kingdom); accord id.
(statements of Mr. Chance of Canada and Mr. Baron van Boetzelaer of the Netherlands). In the result, only
a subset of national security concerns, namely those that arise during war or other grave and exceptional
circumstances, were deemed sufficient to justify provisional measures.
53. This standard was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons atits
Second Session. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons,U.N. ESCOR, 2nd
Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/8 (1950). It was, however, dropped at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, at which it was noted that "the expression 'national emergency' seemed unduly restrictive."
Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and StatelessPersons:Summary Record of the
Sixth Meeting, supra note 52, at 14 (statement of Mr. Rochefort of France).
54. The Australian delegate proposed the language "time of grave tension, national or international,"
which was explicitly rejected by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. Conference of Plenipotentiarieson
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons:Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting, supra note 52, at 16.
The French view that derogation should be allowed in the event of "cold war, approximating to a state of
war, tension, a state of emergency or an international crisis calling for certain precautions" must therefore
also be taken to have been impliedly rejected. Id. at 14.
55. This language was proposed by the representative of the Netherlands, and adopted by the British
delegate in the motion which ultimately was approved at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries. Id. at 16. It
remains that this is a more fluid standard than, for example, that subsequently adopted in the Civil and
Political Covenant, which only allows a suspension of rights if there is a "public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174.
56. This is, of course, clear from the literal text of the article, which explicitly sanctions a state
"taking provisionally measures which it considers to be essential to the national security ... pending a
[refugee status] determination." Indeed, while the Australian representative argued perhaps most strenuously for a wide-ranging power of derogation, even he made clear "that it was never his delegation's
intention to open the way to an indefinite extension of the circumstances in which states could take
exceptional measures." Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons:
Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting, supranote 52, at14 (statement of Mr. Shaw).
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avail itself of the provisional measures authority must proceed in good faith
to verify the claims to refugee status of all persons whose rights are thereby
suspended.57 If a particular person is found not to be a Convention refugee,
including on the basis of criminal or other exclusion under Article I(F), no
rights under the Refugee Convention accrue, and removal from the territory
or the imposition of other restrictions is allowed.58 If, on the other hand, an
individual is found to satisfy the Convention refugee definition, Article 9
establishes a presumption that the provisional measures shall no longer be
applied to that person.5 9 Clearly, by disallowing suspension of refugee rights
either generally or in circumstances that do not meet the rigorous standards
of Article 9, the Convention cannot possibly be understood to establish no
more than a hortatory rights regime.
The obligatory nature of refugee rights is clear not only from the plain
meaning of the Convention's textual structure and the strictly limited right to
suspend respect for refugee rights under Article 9, but more generally from
the way in which the Refugee Convention defines the acquisition of refugee
rights. Specifically, refugees acquire rights as a function of their level of
attachment to a particular state party. They are entitled to an expanding array
of rights as their relationship with the asylum state deepens over the course of
a four-part assimilation path. At the lowest level of attachment, some
refugees are subject to a state's authority simply because they are physically
present within territory under its jurisdiction. A greater attachment is manifest when the refugee is deemed to be lawfully present within the state. A still
more significant attachment is inherent when the refugee is lawfully staying
in the country. Finally, a small number of rights are reserved for refugees who
can demonstrate durable residence in the asylum state. The Convention
requires that a more fulsome range of needs and aspirations be met as the
refugee's relationship to the asylum state is solidified.
The drafters' decision to grant refugee rights on an incremental basis
reflected the experience of states confronted with the unplanned arrival of
refugees at their frontiers. While overseas asylum states continued mainly to

57. "During the war ... [iut was impossible to give all persons entering the country as refugees a
thorough security examination, which had to be deferred till exceptional circumstances made it necessary." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 35th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.35 (1950) (statement of Sir Leslie Brass of the United Kingdom). As Robinson observes,
"[tihe purpose of Art. 9 is to permit the wholesale provisional internment of refugees in time of war,
followed by a screening process." NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF

95 (1953).
58. Countervailing domestic or international legal obligations, for example duties to avoid removal
under the Torture Convention, may operate independently to prevent removal from the asylum country.
Torture Convention, supra note 8, at 1028 (art. 3(1)).
59. Robinson argues that the provisional measures "have to be suspended if the person involved can
prove conclusively his status as a refugee." ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 95. The literal meaning of Art. 9
cannot, however, sustain this interpretation. The requirement that in the case of a refugee "the continuance
of such measures [must be] necessary in his case in the interests of national security" is, however, a
sufficient basis to argue that absent such a finding, provisional measures must be terminated. Convention,
supra note 10, at 160 (art. 9).
REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION
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receive refugees pre-selected for resettlement, 6° several European countries
were already faced with what has today become the dominant pattern of
refugee flows, namely the unplanned and unauthorized arrival of refugees at
a state's borders. The drafters of the Convention explicitly considered how
best to align the refugee rights regime with this transition from an essentially
managed system of refugee migration, to a mixed system in which at least
some refugees would move independently:
[T]he initial reception countries were obliged to give shelter to refugees
who had not, in fact, been properly admitted but who had, so to speak,
imposed themselves upon the' hospitality of those countries. As the
definition of refugee made no distinction between those who had been
properly admitted and the others, however, the question arose whether
the initial reception countries would be required under the convention
to grant the same protection to refugees who had entered the country
legally and those who had done so without prior authorization.6 1
The compromise reached was that any unauthorized refugee at or within a
state's borders would benefit from the protections of the Refugee Convention,6 2 but they would not immediately acquire all the rights of "regularly
admitted" refugees, that is, those pre-authorized to enter and to reside in an
asylum state. Instead, as under French law, basic rights would be granted to
all refugees, with additional rights following as the legal status of the refugee
was consolidated.6 3 The Refugee Convention implements this commitment
by defining a continuum of legal attachment to the asylum state.

60.

The Chairman,

speaking as the representative of Canada, observed that the question raised by the initial reception
countries did not apply to his country, which was separated by an ocean from the refugee zones.
Thanks to that situation, all refugees immigrating to Canada were ipsofacto legally admitted and
enjoyed the recognized rights granted to foreigners admitted for residence.
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 1st Sess., 7th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc.
E/AC/32/SR.7 (1950) (statement of Mr. Chance of Canada).
61. Id. at 12 (statement of Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium).
62. It did not follow, however, "that the convention would not apply to persons fleeing from
persecution who asked to enter the territory of the contracting parties .... [W]hether or not the refugee
was in a regular position, he must not be turned back to a country where his life or freedom could be
threatened." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 1st Sess., 20th mtg. at
11-12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States) (emphasis
added).
63. According to the French representative,
the problem would be seen more clearly if it were divided into three different aspects: the first
concerned the treatment of refugees before they had reached an understanding with the authorities
of the recipient countries; the second referred to their right to have their situation regularized and
the conditions in which that was to be done; the third dealt with their rights after they had been
lawfully authorized to reside in the country, which meant, in the case of France, after they were in
possession of a residence card and a work card.
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 1st Sess., 15th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc.
E/AC/32/SR. 15 (1950) (statement of Mr. Rain of France).
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A significant number of rights are attributed to "refugees" without
qualification of any kind, 64 and several other rights accrue to all refugees who
are simply "in" or "within" a contracting state's territory.65 In most cases,6 6

these formulations amount to the same thing: any refugee physically present,
lawfully or unlawfully, in territory under a state's jurisdiction may invoke
these rights,6 7 including protection against refoulement and discrimination,

access to a state's courts, religious freedom, and the right to benefit from
rationing and educational systems.6 8 Identity papers are to be issued to
refugees without documentation, penalties on account of illegal entry or
presence are prohibited, and restrictions on internal freedom of movement
must be justifiable. This conclusion follows not only from the plain meaning
of the physical presence text, but also from the express intention of the
drafters69 and the context of the Convention as a whole. 70 These rights may
not legitimately be withheld pending regularization of status, but must be
granted even to
71

"...refugees

who had not yet been regularly admitted into a

country."

Refugees who are not simply physically present, but who are also lawfully
in the territory of a state party, are further entitled to claim the rights that

64. See Convention, supra note 10, at 156 (art. 3 "non-discrimination"), 162 (art. 12 "personal
status"; art. 13 "movable and immovable property"), 164 (art. 16(1) "access to courts"), 166 (art. 20
"rationing"), 168 (art. 22 "education"), 172 (art. 29 "fiscal charges"), 176 (art. 33 "prohibition of
expulsion or return-'refoulement' ";art. 34 "naturalization").
65. See id. at 156-58 (art. 4 "religion"), 172 (art. 27 "identity papers"), 174 (art. 31(1) "nonpenalization for illegal entry or presence"; 31(2) "movements of refugees unlawfully in the country of
refuge").
66. Rights attributed to "refugees" without qualification must, however, be granted to all refugees
who, while not within a state's own territory, are in territory under a state's de facto control (e.g., in
illegally occupied territory).
67. In a critical exchange, the American representative observed "that some of the articles did not
specifically indicate to which refugees they applied. He presumed that the mention of 'refugees' without
any qualifying phrase was intended to include all refugees, whether lawfully or unlawfully in a territory."
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 41st mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.41 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States). The immediate and unchallenged
response of the Chairman was "that the United States representative's presumption was correct." Id.
(statement of the Chairman, Mr. Larsen of Denmark).
68. See supra notes 64-65.
69. Accord U.N. ESCORAd Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 1st Sess., 15th mtg. at
22, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.15 (1950) (statement of Mr. Larsen of Denmark) who persuaded the Ad Hoc
Committee to draw up "a number of fairly simple rules for the treatment of refugees not yet authorized to
reside in a country." To similar effect, the representative of the International Refugee Organization
stressed the importance of including in the Convention "provisions concerning refugees who had not yet
been regularly admitted." Id. at 18.
70. The interpretation of the Refugee Convention as granting rights even prior to formal verification
of status is buttressed by the specific incorporation of Art. 9 in the Refugee Convention. Article 9 allows
governments provisionally to suspend the rights of persons not yet confirmed to be refugees if the asylum
state is faced with war or other exceptional circumstance. It follows from the inclusion of this provision in
the Convention that, absent such extreme circumstances, states cannot suspend rights pending verification
of status. See Convention, supra note 10, at 160 (art. 9).
71. U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 1st Sess., 15th mtg. at 18,
U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR. 15 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States). The Danish representative similarly distinguished between "refugees regularly resident" and "those ...who had just arrived in
the initial reception country." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness & Related Problems, 16th
mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR. 16 (1950) (statement of Mr. Larsen of Denmark).
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apply at the second level of attachment. Lawful presence entitles refugees to
engage in self-employment, enjoy internal freedom of movement, and be
protected against expulsion. 7 2 Lawful presence is broadly defined. 73 Most
important, the stage between "irregular" presence and the granting of
permission either to stay in the asylum state or to resettle elsewhere is a form
of "lawful presence.", 74 Presence is lawful in the case of" . . . a person...
not yet in possession of a residence permit but who had applied for it and had
the receipt for that application. Only those persons who had not applied, or
whose applications had been refused, were in an irregular position" (emphasis added).75 The drafters recognized that refugees who travel without
pre-authorization to a state party, but who are admitted to a process intended
to assess their suitability for admission to that or another state, should "...
for purposes of the future convention, to have been regularly
be considered,
76
admitted.

It is nonetheless sometimes suggested that a refugee is not lawfully present
until permanent residence is granted,7 7 or at least until refugee status has

72. See Convention, supra note 10, at 166 (art. 18 "self-employment"), 172 (art. 26 "freedom of
movement"), and 174 (art. 32 "expulsion"). Goodwin-Gill, however, asserts that Art. 32 rights need be
granted only to refugees who are "in the State on a more or less indefinite basis." Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL,
THm REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (1996). He offers no legal argument to justify this clear
deviation from the express provisions of the Convention, relying instead on a bald appeal to the
importance of achieving consistency with relevant state practice. State practice may assist in establishing
the interpretation of a treaty provision. See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, at 340 (art. 31(3)(b)).
However, state practice standing alone cannot give rise to a legal norm that may be relied upon to
challenge the applicability of a conflicting treaty stipulation.
73. The French representative described this level of attachment as "a very wide term applicable to
any refugee, whatever his origin or situation. It was therefore a term having a very broad meaning." U.N.
ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 42nd mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.42 (1950) (statement of Mr. Juvigny of France).
74. The French description of the three phases through which a refugee passes distinguished the
second step of "regularization" of status from the third and final stage at which "they had been lawfully
authorized to reside in the country." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Stateless & Related Persons, 1st
Sess., 15th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR. 15 (1950) (statement of Mr. Rain of France).
75. Id. at 20 (statement of Mr. Rain of France).
76. Id. (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States).
77. Grahl-Madsen, for example, equivocates in his analysis of the status of refugees awaiting
verification of their claims by authorities. He suggests that "a refugee may be 'lawfully' in a country for
some purposes while 'unlawfully' there for other purposes... Furthermore, a refugee's presence may, on
the face of it, be 'illegal' according to some set of rules (e.g. aliens legislation), yet 'legal' within a wider
frame of reference (e.g. international refugee law)." ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 363 (1972). He ultimately adopts the definition of "regularization" stated by the
British delegate to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, namely "the acceptance by a country of a refugee
for permanent settlement, not the mere issue of documents prior to the duration of his stay." Conference of
Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Fourteenth
Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 14th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR. 14 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the
United Kingdom). While this approach was endorsed by the representatives of some states not then
experiencing the direct arrival of refugees, it was rejected as insufficiently attentive to the situation of
those countries, such as France, that were obliged to process refugees arriving directly through a process
of regularization involving successive stages. See U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness &
Related Problems, Ist Sess., 15th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR. 15 (1950) (description of the French
system provided by the Belgian delegate). The inappropriateness of the equation of a "lawful presence"
with admission to permanent residence was explicitly brought to the attention of the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries by its President:
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been formally verified.7 8 In our view, these positions contradict the plain
meaning of "lawful presence." Where the laws of a state authorize the direct
arrival of refugees who submit to a status determination or comparable
procedure, it cannot sensibly be argued that refugees who avail themselves of
this legal option are not lawfully present. So long as a refugee has provided
authorities with the information that will enable them to consider his or her
entitlement to refugee status, in particular, details of personal and national
identity and the facts relied upon in support of the claim for admission, there
is clearly a legal basis for the refugee's presence. 79 The once irregularly

[Sluch a suggestion would probably cover the situation in the United States of America, where
there were [only] two categories of entrants, those legally admitted and those who had entered
clandestinely. But it might not cover the situation in other countries where there were a number of
intermediatestages; for example, certain countries allowed refugees to remain in their territory for
a limited time.
Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and StatelessPersons:Summary Record of the
FourteenthMeeting, U.N. GAOR, 14th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR. 14 (1951) (statement of the
President, Mr. Larsen of Denmark) (emphasis added). The only response to this clarification was an
assertion by the representative of the United States that his country's system was not quite as simple as the
President had implied. No delegate, however, challenged the accuracy of the President's understanding of
"lawful presence" as including refugees subject to the various "intermediate stages" which a country
might establish while verifying the claims of refugees arriving directly at their territories.
Grahl-Madsen's approach is also problematic because it conflates the categories of "lawful presence"
and "lawful stay," thereby raising a concern of consistency with the general context of the Convention.
Even as the drafters varied the level of attachment applicable to specific rights, they expressly opted to
grant some rights at an intermediate point between "physical presence" and "lawful stay"-namely,
"lawful presence." Yet under Grahl-Madsen's approach, there is no such intermediate point. Refugees
would move directly from being merely physically (but "irregularly") present, to securing simultaneously
all the rights associated with both "lawful presence" and "lawful stay" when and if permanent residence
is granted. See also ROBINSON, supranote 57, at 154.
78. While there is limited support in the drafting history for such an interpretation (see, e.g.,
Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the
FourteenthMeeting, U.N. GAOR, 14th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR. 14 (1951) (statement of Mr.
Larsen of Denmark)), this approach risks allowing genuine refugees to be "held hostage" to a state
decision not to formally process a claim to Convention refugee status. An interpretation that "lawful stay"
begins only at the time of official recognition of status erroneously assumes that states are under an
obligation formally to verify refugee status. Because there is in fact no such duty, the conditioning of
"lawful presence" on formal verification of refugee status would allow states perpetually to deny refugee
rights defined by the second level of attachment by refusing formally to verify refugee status, an
interpretation clearly in conflict with the general context of the Refugee Convention and the duty to
implement treaties in good faith.
79. Consistent with the duty of states to implement their international legal obligations in good faith,
it must be possible for all Convention refugees to fulfill any such requirements. Excluded, therefore, are
any requirements that are directed to matters unrelated to refugee status, including suitability for
immigration on economic, cultural, personal, or other grounds. Account must also be taken of any genuine
disabilities faced by particular refugees, for example by reason of language, education, lack of trust, or the
residual effects of stress or trauma, which may make it difficult for them to provide authorities with the
information required to verify their refugee status. Because refugee status assessment involves a shared
responsibility between the refugee and national authorities, see UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 21, 1 196,
it is the responsibility of the receiving state to take all reasonable steps to assist refugees to state their
claims to protection with clarity. See generally ROBERT BARSKY, CONSTRUCTING A PRODUCTIVE OTHER:
DISCOURSE THEORY AND THE CONVENTION REFUGEE HEARING (1994); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, REBUILDING

TRUST (1993); A. LEISS & R. BoEsJES, FEMALE ASYLUM SEEKERS (1994); UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE CHILDREN: GUIDELINES ON PROTECTION AND CARE (1994); Walter

Kain, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandingsin the Asylum Hearing, 20 INT'L.
MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986).
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present refugee is now lawfully present, 80 as he or she has satisfied the
administrative requirements established by the state to consider which
persons who arrive without authorization should nonetheless be allowed to
remain there. Lawful presence continues during the assessment process and
pending any review or appeal. The applicant's presence ceases to be lawful
upon a final decision to refuse recognition of refugee status.
Those refugees who are not simply lawfully in a country's territory, but
who are lawfully staying there, also benefit from freedom of association, the
right to engage in wage-earning employment and to practice a profession,
access to housing and welfare, protection of labor and social security
legislation, intellectual property rights, travel documentation, consular assistance, and exemption from legislative reciprocity. 8 There was extraordinary
linguistic confusion in deciding upon how best to label this third level of
attachment.8 2 The term "lawfully staying" was ultimately incorporated in the
Convention as the most accurate rendering of the French language concept of
"rrsidant reguli~rement," the meaning of which was agreed to be controlling.83 .

Most fundamentally, "residence rrguli~re" is not synonymous with such
legal notions as domicile or permanent resident status.8 4 Instead, the drafters
80. Grahl-Madsen suggests one potentially important exception to this general principle. He argues
that a refugee who is detained pending verification of his claim to Convention refugee status (presumably
on grounds that meet the justifiability test of Art. 31(2) of the Convention) can no longer be considered to
be "lawfully" present. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 77, at 361-62. This conclusion is clearly tenable,
though not based on decisions reached during the drafting process. A detained refugee claimant would still
be entitled to those rights that are not restricted to refugees whose presence is lawful, i.e. the rights defined
by the first level of attachment.
81. See Convention, supra note 10, at 162 (art. 14 "artistic and industrial property"; art. 15 "right of
association"), 164 (art. 17 "wage-earning employment"), 166 (art. 19 "liberal professions"; art. 21
"housing"), 168 (art. 23 "public relief"; art. 24 "labour legislation and social security"), 170 (art. 25
"administrative assistance"), and 172 (art. 28 "travel documents"). In specific circumstances, the benefit
of Arts. 7(2) ("exemption from reciprocity") and 17(2) (exemption from restrictive measures imposed on
aliens in the context of "wage-earning employment") may also be claimed.
82. "The Chairman emphasized that the Committee was not writing Anglo-American law or French
law, but international law in two languages. The trouble was that both the English-speaking and the
French-speaking groups were trying to produce drafts which would automatically accord with their
respective legal systems and accepted legal terminology." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees &
Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 42nd mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.42 (1950) (statement of the
Chairman, Mi. Larsen of Denmark).
83. "The Committee experienced some difficulty with the phrases 'lawfully in the territory' in
English and 'r6sidant rrgulirement' in French. It decided however that the latter phrase in French should
be rendered in English by 'lawfully staying in the territory." Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Status
of Refugees and Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting: Report of the Style
Committee, U.N. GAOR, Agenda Item 6, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/102 (1951).
84. The U.S. representative
could not accept "rdsidant r~gulirement" if it was to be translated by 'lawfully resident,' which
would not cover persons who were not legally resident in the English sense. It would not, for
example, cover persons staying in the United States on a visitor's visa, and perhaps it might not
even cover persons who had worked for the United Nations for five years in Geneva. The word
'residence' in English, though not exactly equivalent to 'domicile,' since it was possible to have
more than one residence, had much of the same flavour.
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 42nd mtg. at 24, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.42 (1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States).
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emphasized that it was the refugee's de facto circumstances which determine
whether or not the third level of attachment is satisfied.8 5 The notion of
'r6sidence r6gulire' is "very wide in meaning ...[and] implie[s] a settling
down and, consequently, a certain length of residence." 8 6 While neither a
prolonged stay 87 nor the establishment of habitual residence8 8 is required, the
refugee's presence in the state party must be ongoing in practical terms. 89
Professor Grahl-Madsen, for example, argues that lawful stay may be
implied from an officially tolerated stay beyond the last date that an
individual is allowed to remain in a country without securing a residence
permit (usually three to six months). 90
Finally, a few rights are reserved for refugees who reside in the contracting
state. Habitually resident refugees have a right to legal aid, and to receive
national treatment in regard to the posting of security for costs in a court
proceeding. 9 ' After a period of three years' residence, refugees are also to be
exempted from both requirements of legislative reciprocity, 9 2 and any
restrictive measures imposed on the employment of aliens.93 As can be seen
from the short list of rights subject to the fourth level of attachment, there was

85. "[T]here were two alternatives: either to say 'r~sidant rfguli~rement' and 'lawfully resident,' or to
say 'lawfully' in which case 'r~sidant' must be omitted, otherwise, there would be too many complications
in the translation of the various articles... [Ilt would be better to say 'rdguli~rement,' since 'l6galement'
seemed too decidedly legal." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess.,
42nd mtg. at 33-34, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.42 (1950) (statement of Mr. Juvigny of France).
86. Id. at 12 (statement of Mr. Juvigny of France).
87. "[T]he expression 'rdsidant r~guli~rement' did not imply a lengthy stay, otherwise the expression
'residance continue' ... would have been employed." U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees &
Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 41st mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.41 (1950) (statement of Mr. Juvigny
of France).
88. "In the articles in question, the term used in the French text had been 'rdsidence habituelle' which
implied some considerable length of residence. As a concession, the French delegation had agreed to
substitute the words 'rfsidance r~gulire' which were far less restrictive in meaning." U.N. ESCOR Ad
Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 42nd mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.42
(1950) (statement of Mr. Juvigny of France).
89. The French representative suggested that the refugee's presence would have to be "more or less
permanent" to satisfy the third level of attachment. Id.
90. According to Grahl-Madsen,
[c]onsidering that three months seems to be almost universally accepted as the period for which an
alien may remain in a country without needing a residence permit ... it would seem that once a
refugee, having filed the requisite application, has remained for more than three months, he should
be considered 'lawfully staying', even though the authority for his continued sojourn merely is a
'provisional receipt' or its equivalent ....This leads us to the more general observation, that a
refugee is 'residant regulierement' ('lawfully staying') ...
if he is in possession of a residence
permit (or its equivalent) entitling him to remain there for more than three months, or if he actually
is lawfully present in a territory beyond a period of three months after his entry (or after his
reporting himself to the authorities, as the case may be).
GRAHL-MADSEN,supra note 77, at 353-54.
91. Convention, supra note 10, at 164 (art. 16(2)).
92. Id. at 158 (art. 7(2)).
93. An earlier exemption from alien employment restrictions is required in the case of a refugee who
was already exempt from such requirements at the time the Convention entered into force for the state
party; or where the refugee is married to, or the parent of, a national of the state party. Id. at 164 (art.
17(2)).
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little enthusiasm among the drafters for the conditioning of access to refugee
rights on the satisfaction of a durable residence requirement.
In sum, there is simply no basis to suggest that the Refugee Convention
establishes anything other than a binding regime of rights that inhere in all
refugees. This is clear from the basic textual structure of the treaty, which
first defines a "refugee" and then enumerates the rights that follow from
refugee status; from the extremely limited ability of states to depart from the
duty to respect those norms; and from the carefully crafted system for
allocating rights on the basis of a particular refugee's attachment to a
particular country of refuge. Except to the extent it has exercised its right to
make reservations under Article 42, no state has the right to redefine the
entitlements that follow from Convention refugee status.
II.

AcCESSION BY THE UNITED STATES TO

THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME

The United States played an important role in drafting the Refugee
Convention and in elaborating the rights of refugees provided therein, but it
did not sign the Convention. U.S. policy was instead to respond to refugee
crises on an ad hoc, discretionary basis. 94 Even the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act, 95 drafted immediately after the entry into force of the
Refugee Convention, contained no specific duty to admit refugees. It did,
however, move modestly beyond reliance on situation-specific legislative
responses by establishing two generic means by which refugees might be
admitted to the United States.
First, refugees could be brought to the United States by the Executive in
reliance on its general authority to parole into the United States any person
whose entry "for emergent reasons [was] deemed strictly in the public
interest.96 Under the terms of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, this
entry was both discretionary and temporary, and could be revoked at any time
by the Attorney General. Because persons allowed to enter under the parole
authority were not technically "admitted" to the United States, they were
moreover not rights-holders under U.S. law."' 97 In practice, however, because
refugee admissions were seen as an instrument of Cold War foreign policy,
parolees (almost all from Communist-dominated countries or the Middle
East) were routinely allowed to regularize their status in the United States.9 8
94. Such an ad hoc approach was consistent with the pattern of earlier congressional enactments in
response to specific situations. See, e.g., Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009
(amended in 1950 and 1951). This practice continued with legislation such as the Refugee Relief Act, Pub.
L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), extended in 1957, and the Fair Share Law, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat.
504 (1960).
95. INA, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
96. Id. at § 212(d)(5).
97. See Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty Year Crisis:A Legislative History of the Refugee
Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 9, 15 (1981).
98. See id. at 13.
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Alternatively, persons already inside the United States and facing deportation could apply for relief under § 243(h) of the Act, which authorized the
Attorney General to withhold the deportation of an applicant illegally in the
United States upon a finding that he would be subject to "physical persecution" if returned to his country origin. As in the case of parole, however, an
affirmative decision on withholding did not result in any specific grant of
rights or protections. The withholding provision moreover came to be
interpreted by the BIA in a highly restrictive fashion, so that a favorable grant
of discretion was limited to cases "of clear probability of persecution of the
particular individual petitioner. " 99 While purely a creature of administrative
interpretation, this standard of proof was in practice determinative because of
the extraordinary deference granted to BIA practice by reviewing courts.'°
Congress substantially amended INA in 1965 in an effort to regularize
somewhat the admission of refugees to the United States. As regards the
entry of refugees selected abroad, § 203(a)(7) of the amended Act established
a fixed quota of conditional entry visas to be allocated to persons who
...because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion had fled ...from any Communist or

Communist-dominated country or area, or... from any country within
the general area of the Middle East, and [who] are unable to unwilling
to return to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political
opinion . ...
Refugees admitted under this category were subject to a review of admissibility after two years in the United States. If successful, they were entitled to
apply for permanent resident alien status.10 2 While this conditional entry
system was intended by Congress to constrain the Executive's use of the
parole authority to the admission of refugees from overseas in limited,
emergency situations, the scope of the parole power was left fully intact to
enable its use in situations serving the national interest.10 3 Because the
numerical cap established by Congress on § 203(a)(7) visas was so limited,
the Attorney General continued to resort to parole as an additional means by
which to admit refugees to the United States. 'o4

99. In reJoseph, 13 1. & N. Dec. 70,72 (BIA 1968).
100. See, e.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir.
1967); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified 676 E2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982).
101. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 912.
102. See David Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH.Y.B. INTL. LEGAL
STUD. 91, 96; Anker & Posner, supra note 97, at 18.
103. The failure simply to abolish the parole power may be explained by its utility beyond the refugee
field. See Martin, supranote 102, at 93.
104. See Anker & Posner, supra note 97, at 18-19. A maximum of 10,200 immigration visas per
annum was authorized.
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The 1965 amendments also moved the United States substantially closer to
de facto incorporation of the Refugee Convention into domestic law. Whereas
previously only persons already in the United States and able to show that
they had been, or would be subject to, "physical persecution" had been
entitled to seek relief by way of withholding of deportation, the 1965
legislation amended the withholding authority in two ways. 15 First, the
reference to "physical persecution" was deleted in favor of the international
standard of "persecution" (without qualification). Second, a variant of the
international nexus criterion was adopted, pursuant to which withholding
could be sought by persons who feared or who had experienced "persecution
on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 10 6 These changes did not,
however, bring the United States into compliance with international refugee
law.
First and most obviously, two of the five grounds upon which the Refugee
Convention authorizes claims to be made, nationality and membership of a
particular social group, were still missing. Second, the BIA's probabilitybased standard of proof (rather than simply "well-founded fear of persecution") continued to govern access to the remedy of withholding of deportation. Third, withholding of deportation was inaccessible to persons at, as
opposed to within, the U.S. borders. While under international law an
individual arriving at a state's borders is entitled to claim refugee status and
hence protection against refoulement,10 7 an alien was authorized to request
withholding of deportation under U.S. law only once technically inside the
territory of the United States. Because a refugee at a port of entry was not
legally able to assert a right to § 243(h) protection, t ° 8 there was a critical gap
between the U.S. remedy of withholding of deportation and the duty of
non-refoulement under international law.
U.S. refugee protection efforts prior to accession to the Refugee Protocol
were thus fairly schizophrenic. The unquestioned focus of the U.S. system
was the resettlement of refugees from the Communist world and the Middle
East.109 These refugees were admitted through the Executive's parole authority or under conditional entry visas without any serious examination of
particularized risks, and were in most cases quickly processed for permanent
admission to the United States. On the other hand, a person who managed to
enter the United States through independent effort was required to satisfy a
very high standard of proof in order to benefit from a discretionary grant of
105. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11, 79 Stat. 911,
913.
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
108. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (holding that an alien in exclusion proceedings
who had been paroled into the United States had not made an "entry" and so was ineligible to seek
withholding of deportation).
109. See Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Appraisal of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 865, 871-72
(1982). On occasion, other refugee groups benefited from comparably generous treatment, e.g., Ugandan
Asians expelled by Idi Amin. See Anker & Posner, supra note 97, at 26 n.76.
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withholding of deportation. If able to show an individualized risk amounting
to a probability of persecution, asylum seekers on American territory were
eligible to request the Attorney General to allow them to remain in the United
States, but were without any clear or durable status.
This early experience is important, because it set the tone for all future
American refugee protection efforts. While the international refugee regime
does not even address the resettlement of at-risk persons who have yet to
leave their own country or who have found temporary safety in camps or
elsewhere, such work was the essence of the U.S. "refugee" system. Indeed,
the United States routinely referred to such persons as refugees, and granted
them extensive rights in the United States. On the other hand, persons not
pre-selected for resettlement in the United States, but who arrived at U.S.
borders of their own initiative to seek protection, were not treated as
refugees, and were dealt with on a purely discretionary basis. This approach,
too, was the opposite of what the international refugee regime required.
Persons inside or at the frontier of a state party who meet the Convention
refugee definition are rights-holders under international law, and must be
protected against refoulement and granted the balance of the rights stipulated
in the Refugee Convention. U.S. practice, in contrast, was simply to allow
refugees arriving directly in the United States to seek purely discretionary
protection from the Attorney General, based on a standard that bore only a
general resemblance to the international refugee definition.
A. Ratification of the Refugee Protocol
The United States formally signaled its intention to be bound by international refugee law when it acceded to the Refugee Protocol in 1968. During
the Senate hearings on ratification of the treaty, both the Executive and
Senate clearly acknowledged that the decision to become a party to the
Protocol resulted in legal obligations towards refugees. In his report to
President Lyndon Johnson recommending submission of the Protocol to the
Senate, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the Protocol
...binds acceding states to apply substantive Articles 2 through 34 of
the Convention. Thus, parties to the Protocol are bound to extend to
refugees the benefits of the Convention .... Given these [Convention]
rights, the opportunity exists for refugees to become self-supporting
1o
and to live in dignity and self-respect ....

In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the
acting deputy director of the State Department's Office of Refugee and
Migration Affairs emphasized this view, repeating that "[t]he Protocol binds
acceding states to apply substantive Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention,
110. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 90-K (1968), cited in 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 123, 124 (1969).
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which in fact comprise the Bill of Rights for refugees." '" He elaborated that
the Protocol was a "universal covenant designed to secure necessary protection in asylum countries for those fleeing from their homelands because, of
persecution, and also, importantly, those rights which are necessary .to their
12
When
re-establishment as self-supporting members of other societies."'
Committhe
from
excerpts
floor,
the Protocol was introduced on the Senate
tee report were included in the record, specifically that "[i]f the United States
accedes to the Protocol, it is automatically bound to apply Articles 2 through
34 of the 1951 Convention .... 11 3 There can therefore be no doubt that the
United States understood that the Protocol entitles refugees to claim a
specific set of rights from state parties.
At the level of detail, however, the Executive did not clearly indicate to the
Senate what changes would be required to bring U.S. law into conformity
with the Protocol. To the contrary, the essential position taken by the
Executive was that the United States was already in compliance with all legal
duties that would follow from signing the Protocol. 114 The Senate was told
that the withholding of deportation provisions of the INA were "consistent
with" 115 Articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee Convention, in consequence of
which the Attorney General would "be able to administer such provisions in
conformity with the Protocol, without amendment of the [Immigration and
Nationality Act]." 1 1 6 This declaration was clearly misleading, but was
nonetheless technically true on most points if understood simply as an
indication that the Executive could bring the United States into conformity
with the Protocol without need of new legislation.
The most fundamental problem with the Executive's representation is that
the Refugee Convention consists of more than just Articles 32 and 33. Even if
the withholding of deportation remedy were to implement those two international duties, it was not (and is not) designed to ensure that refugees receive
the benefit of-the balance of the rights owed them under Articles 2-31 of the
Refugee Convention. On the other hand, the Executive's representation was
not clearly false, since nothing in § 243(h) prevented the United States from
granting the additional rights owed to refugees.

111. S. REP. No. 90-14, at 6 (1968) (statement of Laurence Dawson).
112. Id.at4.
113. 110 CONG. REc. 22931 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1968).
114. "[R]efugees in the United States have long enjoyed the protection and the rights which the
Protocol calls for, on at least a basis equal to that which signatories to the Protocol would undertake to
implement for refugees within their respective territories." S. REP. No. 90-14, supra note 111 (testimony
of Laurence Dawson).
115.

Id.

116. Id. In Professor Fitzpatrick's view, "[t]he Administration's minimization of the obligations
immanent in the Protocol is understandable as a cautious strategy to secure the Senate's consent and bring
the United States within a crucial international legal regime. The Administration had good reason to fear
that the Senate remained under the sway of 'Bricker Amendment' skepticism towards treaties with a
human rights dimension. If the Senate could be convinced that the Protocol would effect no alterations in
domestic law, Senate consent would be secured much more easily." Fitzpatrick, supranote 14, at 5.
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Also problematic was the simplistic equation of the domestic remedy of
withholding of deportation with the duties of non-expulsion and nonrefoulement under Articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee Convention. While the
domestic and international standards admittedly address comparable substantive concerns, they are not interchangeable. First, withholding of deportation
was a purely discretionary remedy, whereas the protections of Articles 32 and
33 are mandatory. The only way that withholding of deportation could
implement Articles 32 and 33 would therefore have been for the Attorney
17
General to conform administrative practice to international obligations."
That is, the Attorney General could have complied with U.S. duties under the
Protocol by interpreting the phrase "alien ...

subject to persecution" to

include all persons able to show a "well-founded fear of being persecuted,"
and by committing the United States to always agreeing to withhold deportation for persons able to meet this standard, the technically discretionary
charter of § 243(h) notwithstanding. While the textual fluidity of § 243(h)
might have theoretically allowed the Attorney General to make such a shift,
conflicting administrative practice made this difficult. As previously noted,
the BIA interpreted § 243(h) to set a higher (probability based) standard to
determine eligibility than the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard of
1 18
the Protocol.
And even if it had been possible to overcome this administrative law
impediment to the equation of the standard of proof, two other inconsistencies between the duty of non-removal of refugees under international and
U.S. refugee law remained. As noted in the preceding section, both the failure
to embrace claims based on a nexus to either nationality or membership of a
particular social group" 9 and the refusal to allow persons at, but not inside,
the border to seek withholding from deportation12 0 meant that U.S. practice
fell short of the Protocol's requirements. Yet here again, at least the second of
these concerns could have been addressed by a change in the regulations, that
121
is, without need of new legislation.
Giving the Executive the benefit of the doubt, the State Department
representations must have been intended to reassure the Congress that it
would not be required to enact new legislation in order to give force to the
Refugee Protocol. There is simply no basis upon which the Senate could
reasonably have been advised that U.S. practice prior to accession to the
Protocol in fact conformed to international law. Because that practice did not
link refugee status to refugee rights; was fundamentally discretionary, rather
117. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 4.
118. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
119. See supranote 106 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. It was also suggested by the Supreme Court in Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984), that the absence of reference to "nationality" and "membership in social
groups" could have been overcome by "existing statutory provisions, ... [given] the considerable
discretion in interpreting and implementing such statutory provisions .... "
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than rights-based; predicated even protection against removal on a higher
standard of proof than "well-founded fear"; did not recognize two of the five
grounds upon which refugee status could be claimed; and was not accessible
to persons at, but not inside, U.S. borders, American practice was clearly out
of step with international law.
This failure to fully confront the import of accession to the Protocol led to
conflicting policies and practices. On the one hand, in 1972 the Secretary of
State confirmed that a
primary consideration in U.S. asylum policy is the [Protocol] ....
The principle of asylum inherent in this international treaty ... and its
...

explicit prohibition against the forcible return of refugees to conditions
of persecution, have solidified these concepts further in international
law. As a party to the Protocol, the United States has an international
treaty obligation for its implementation within areas subject to jurisdiction of the United States.' 2 2
A regulatory asylum procedure established in 1974 partially closed one of the
gaps between U.S. and international law by allowing aliens "at an airport or
seaport of entry" to submit an asylum claim for determination by an
Immigration and Nationality Service ("INS") district director following an
oral hearing before an immigration officer. 1 2 3 In 1979, the regulations were
amended again to open the inland discretionary asylum procedure to aliens
already inside the United States, and to refer decisions on the claims lodged
at airports and seaports to an immigration judge in the context of an exclusion
hearing. 124 Yet the standard of proof for access to asylum was not the
"well-founded fear of persecution" language of the Refugee Convention, but
was instead still the probability-based withholding of deportation test. Nor
did success on an application for asylum lead to the granting of the catalogue
of refugee rights set by the Refugee Convention. To the contrary, it merely
entitled the successful applicant to request an exercise of administrative
discretion.
The key 1973 BIA decision in Matter of Dunar12 5 exemplifies this
confusion. On the one hand, the Board referred to the Protocol as a
self-executing treaty and recognized that the United States was obliged to

122. U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release Jan. 11, 1972: General Policyfor Dealing with Requestsfor
Asylum by Foreign Nationals, 66 DEP'T. ST. BuLL., 124, 124-25 (1972).
123. The new regulation nonetheless refused to consider the asylum claims of persons arriving at "a
land border port or pre-clearance station." Applications from such persons were merely referred to "the
nearest American consul," suggesting that claimants would be (illegally) turned away from the U.S.
border pending consideration of their refugee claims. 39 Fed. Reg. 41,832 (1974) (subsequently codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 108).
124. 8C.F.R.§ 108 (1980).
125. 141. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973).
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grant refugees the benefit of Articles 2 through 34.126 Yet the Board appeared
not to have been troubled by the fact that the duty to protect refugees was to
be implemented in U.S. law through the remedy of withholding of deportation under § 243(h), which does not deliver the rights stipulated in Articles 2
through 32. Nor did the Board appear concerned that withholding of
deportation was a purely discretionary remedy, whereas non-refoulement is a
mandatory obligation. The Board ignored this dissonance, asserting that it
knew of no cases "in which a finding has been made that the alien has
established the clear probability that he will be persecuted and in which
§ 243(h) withholding has nevertheless been denied in the exercise of
administrative discretion." 127 Thus, the "sounder approach is to regard the
entire determination as a discretionary assessment of the likelihood1 29of
persecution.. ." 128 and to resolve any concerns on a case-by-case basis.
Second, because the Board chose to work within the framework of
§ 243(h), it simply continued past practice of insisting on "probability"
(rather than "well-founded fear") as the relevant standard of proof applicable to withholding of deportation proceedings. It found that Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention "can produce no meaningful change in the way
§ 243(h) has been applied. Thus far, relief thereunder has never been denied
to an alien who has established that he will probably be persecuted." 1 30 This
extraordinary result was reached by an examination of the legislative history
of accession to the Protocol that "satisfie[d the Board] that the United States
Senate ...did not contemplate that radical changes in existing immigration

laws would be effected." 13 This is an inaccurate reading of the highly
ambiguous legislative history, for reasons canvassed above. 1 3 2 But even if
Congress had expressed itself clearly on this point, domestic legislative
history cannot be relied upon to avoid American duties under a treaty by
which it had agreed to be bound. While the United States was of course free
to limit access to the domestic remedy of withholding of deportation on any
basis it wished, it was not entitled to limit access to protection against
refoulement on terms other than as set by the Refugee Convention. The
Board's decision in Matter of Dunar was in error because it failed to
recognize that once the United States chose to rely on the withholding
remedy to implement its duty of non-refoulement, it lost the flexibility to
constrain entitlement to withholding on grounds not foreseen by international
law.

126. "In acceding to the Protocol, the United States undertook to apply Articles 2 to 34, inclusive, of
the Convention to refugees as defined in the Protocol ....Such a treaty, being self-executing, has the
force and effect of an act of Congress." Id. at 313.
127. Id.at 322.
128. Id. at 323.
129. See id. at 320-21.
130. Id. at 323.
131.
132.

Id. at 314.
See supra notes 110- 13 and accompanying text.
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In sum, Matter of Dunar purported to recognize that the United States is
duty-bound to grant the benefit of Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee
Convention to refugees, yet reached substantive results that are irreconcilable
to that position. The withholding remedy does not deliver the full range of
rights required by the Refugee Protocol; and the one right it does deliver
(non-return) is reserved for only a subset of persons able to meet the
international test of a "well-founded fear" of persecution, and even then is
subject to administrative discretion. And while it is certainly possible to
implement the duty of non-refoulement through a purely discretionary
procedure, there is no reason apart from slavish adherence to past domestic
practice to see reliance on discretion as a "sounder approach." To the
contrary, the risk of error was clearly increased by the Board's decision to see
§ 243(h) as an appropriate mechanism by which to implement Article 33.
This decision may reflect the Board's failure to realize its ability to correct
administrative practice and conform the § 243(h) standard in use to the
requirements of Article 33,133 or, less charitably, a concerted effort to
maintain existing administrative practice with no regard for logic or legal
obligation. Regardless of which explanation is closer to the truth, the
damaging effect of the Dunar decision on the course of U.S. asylum law
cannot be overstated. The view that accession to the Protocol required
nothing more than a continuation of pre-Protocol practice under § 243(h) was
endorsed by the courts of several circuits, which held that the well-founded
' 34
fear and the clear probability standards "will in practice converge,'
leading them to reject a duty to protect refugees who meet the Convention's
"well-founded fear" of persecution standard. 135 And, as addressed in Part III,
this practice had a near determinative impact on the understanding of refugee
law as ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court.
Beginning in 1969, Congress occasionally considered legislative action to
36
bring U.S. refugee law more fully into line with international obligations.
In particular, an early consensus emerged on the importance of domestic

133. See Sharon C. Weinman, INS v. Stevic: A CriticalAssessment, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 391, 406 (1985).
134. Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977).
135. See, e.g., Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129, 132-34 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the immigration
judge's finding that the petitioner had failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution because the
evidence did not prove probable political persecution); Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3rd Cir. 1982)
(holding that "well-founded fear" equates with "clear probability."). Note that Rejaie was decided after
passage of the Refugee Act, demonstrating that some courts apparently refused to recognize that the
Refugee Act had much practical effect. The Supreme Court in Stevic cited, along with Kashani and
Fleurinor,Pereira-Diazv. INS, 551 F.2d 1149 (9th Cit. 1977) and Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2nd Cit.
1976) as holding that the two standards converged. 467 U.S. at 420. The latter two cases, however, do not
so clearly support this conclusion.
136. See, e.g., S. 3202/H.R. 15093, 91st Cong. (1969); H.R. 9112, 91st Cong. (1969); H.R. 17370,
91st Cong. (1970). "In congressional hearings, representatives of the State Department assured Congress
that ratification of the 1967 Refugee Protocol would not require revision of United States law to
implement the Protocol. However, the executive's deeds fell short of its promises, thereby prompting
congressional action." Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to ProtectAliens and Refugees
Under fnternationalHuman Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335, 2343 (1991).
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incorporation of the full Convention refugee definition. 37 But efforts to
reform the inland asylum system took a backseat to the greater attention paid
throughout the 1970s to reforming the overseas refugee admissions program
in order to curb the Executive's use of its parole authority, under which large
numbers of refugees were admitted from overseas without any meaningful
consultation with Congress. 138 No serious attention was paid to the importance of ensuring that determinations of refugee status of applicants physi39
cally in the United States were made in accordance with international law.'
Thus, the early record on the efforts to implement the obligations of the
Protocol is a decidedly mixed one. The clear intention and policy of the
executive branch was to bring domestic law into compliance with international law, and to ensure that refugees received the rights they were due. But
administrative action fell short of that goal. The BIA and many courts
continued to apply the existing "clear probability" standard to inland
determinations, sometimes in language that flagrantly nullified the meaning
of accession to the Protocol. Neither did Congress act decisively to ensure
that the inland refugee protection system conformed to international standards, as it was caught up in trying to exert control over the numbers of
refugees admitted from overseas.
B.

The Refugee Act of 1980

The legislation rightly hailed as a turning point in U.S. asylum law, the
Refugee Act of 1980,140 ironically addressed asylum for persons arriving in
the United States only as an afterthought. In line with the traditional view that
refugees were persons resettled to the United States from overseas, the
impetus to pass a new law was congressional preoccupation to constrain the
practice of the executive branch to admit large numbers of refugees on the
basis of its parole authority. While reform of the domestic refugee protection
system was ultimately included in the legislative package, most congressional debate focused on the primary goal of managing refugee admissions
from abroad.'14 It was only at a hearing before the Senate Committee on the
137. See S. 3202/H.R. 15093 §6(a); H.R. 9112 § 9; H.R. 17370 §9.
138. See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 97, at 21-42.
139. "We had experienced a decade of neglect following the 1965 Act. No immigration legislation of
any consequence had been before Congress for a decade, and the Senate Judiciary Committee had not held
a single hearing or meeting on immigration issues during this period. The unfinished agenda from 1965
was simply ignored, and there was no sign of progress." Edward M. Kennedy, Forewardto Immigration
andNationality Symposium, 19 SAN DIEo L. REV. 1, 1 (1981).

140.
141.

See supra note 13.
See, e.g., Remarks of Congressman Rodino,

Our history in refugee crises has been one of reaction rather than one of anticipation, preparation
and long-range planning. This was brought forcefully to our attention in the spring of 1975 when in
the wake of our withdrawal from Vietnam we were faced with having to care for and resettle
immediately more than 135,000 refugees .... This experience demonstrated, in a dramatic way,
the necessity for enacting coherent legislation to meet future and continuing refugee emergencies.
H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 6 (1979).
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Judiciary that Senator Edward Kennedy noted the recommendation of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that the bill contain some
further clarification on asylum policy. 142 Kennedy therefore suggested that
"it is important that we try and get 4some
recommendations on how we are
3
going to handle asylum questions." 1
Perhaps because action on inland refugee protection was not originally a
goal of the new legislation, very little clear thought was given to how best to
"handle asylum questions" in the United States. The Senate seems to have
latched onto, but not entirely understood, a non-governmental proposal' 44 to
take two forms of action: first, the codification of a process for persons
wishing to seek protection as a refugee in the United States; and second, an
amendment to the existing withholding of deportation rule to ensure that no
refugees would be faced with removal from the United States. The combination of these two provisions was thought sufficient to ensure that the United
States protected refugees affirmatively seeking protection, as well as those
who were already involved in removal proceedings.
Neither of these legislative goals was carefully executed. In order to ensure
that refugees already in removal proceedings were protected, the Refugee
Act amended the traditional U.S. rule on withholding of deportation. While
the withholding provision was not designed with refugee protection in
mind, 145 Congress nonetheless declared that it was re-tooling § 243(h) to
bring it into line with the Refugee Protocol's duty of non-refoulement. The

142. The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 643: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States
Senate, 96th Cong. 36 (1979) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy). See also Martin, supra note 102, at
109 ("In a March 1979 letter to the Secretary of State... the U.S. office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees... discreetly suggested that more should be done with regard to asylum. Noting that the U.S.
is a party to the Protocol ... the UNHCR-urged that these commitments be reflected in mandatory, rather
than discretionary, provisions of U.S. law.").
143. The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 643: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States
Senate, supra note 142.
144. Ingrid Walter, testifying in her capacity as Chair of the Committee on Migration and Refugee
Affairs of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, submitted the following
proposed provision on asylum:
Any person within the United States or at its borders who meets the definition of a refugee as
contained in section 101(a)(42) shall be given an opportunity to apply for asylum in the United
States. The Attorney General shall establish a uniform procedure for an alien, regardless of his
status, applying for asylum who is physically present in the United States, and shall admit any such
alien for lawful permanent residence who meets the definition of a refugee in section 101(a)
(42) ....

When granted asylum, a refugee shall be eligible to adjust his status to that of a permanent
resident in compliance with section 207(b)(1).
Id. at 52. The amendment to § 243(h) was proposed in order to more clearly conform it to the Protocol:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien admitted as a refugee or who meets the
definition of a refugee in section 101(a)(42), other than an alien described in section 241(a)(19)
[deportable on grounds consonant with the Protocol], to any country where such alien has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion.
Id.
145.

See supranote 99 and accompanying text.

2000]

REFUGEE RIGHTS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE

509

earlier phraseology under which withholding was available only to persons
who "would be subject to persecution" was replaced by a reference modeled
on Convention Article 33's extension of protection to persons whose "life or
freedom would be threatened"; the duty to withhold deportation was made
mandatory; return, as well as deportation, was prohibited; and the nexus
criteria were brought into line with those in the Convention refugee definition
by addition of nationality and membership in a particular social group to the
pre-existing list of grounds of claim.
It is important to recognize that Congress felt compelled to make all of
these changes to § 243(h) even though both the Executive and the BIA had
asserted that the United States could implement its duty of non-refoulement
under the old version of § 243(h). The congressional reports betray a lack of
faith in the efficacy of administrative and regulatory efforts to bring U.S. law
and practice into accord with international obligations, and a concomitant
recognition of the need to legislate to avoid U.S. practice in conflict with
duties under the Protocol. For example, the House Committee determined
that it would be "desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of
that section to the Convention ....As with the asylum provision, the

Committee feels that the proposed change in [section] 243(h) is necessary so
that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations under international agreements." 146 The conference report stated the intention of Congress
even more clearly, noting that it adopted the House version of the withholding provision "with the understanding that it is based directly upon the
language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed
consistent with the Protocol."' 14 7 The House version explicitly listed four
conditions under which a person would not be allowed to benefit from the
withholding provision, which essentially mirrored grounds stipulated in
Articles 1(F) and 33(2) of the Convention.148 This history indicates the very
clear intention of Congress to ensure that the withholding provision in
U.S. law would be applied in conformity with the requirements of international law.
Notwithstanding these signals that withholding of deportation should be
reformed to implement the duty to protect refugees in removal proceedings,
Congress failed explicitly to state that the right to withholding of deportation
inheres in "refugees." Because § 243(h) had not traditionally been a
mechanism for the protection of refugees as such, and because Congress did
not dictate that it should be transformed into a rule for the benefit of refugees,
it was possible for the Supreme Court subsequently to rule that refugees are
not entitled to benefit from withholding of deportation. While the evidence is
overwhelming that Congress intended to make § 243(h) a mechanism of
146.
147.

H.R. REP. No.96-608, supra note 141, at 18 (emphasis added).
H.R. CONF. REP. No.96-781, at 20(1980).

148.

H.R. REP. No. 96-608, supra note 141, at47; H.R.CONF. REP. No. 96-781,supra note 147, at 20;

S.REP. No. 96-590, at 20 (1980).
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refugee protection, the decision to pour new international wine into the old
domestic bottle of withholding of deportation proved to be a fatal error.
The confusion in defining the new mechanism for persons who affirmatively seek protection as refugees under § 208(a) was even greater. The
Senate bill which proposed the affirmative asylum provision inexplicably
linked the ability to benefit from asylum to the test for withholding of
deportation. It recommended a
... uniform procedure [including] ... a provision allowing all asylum
applicants an opportunity to have their claims considered outside a
deportation and/or exclusion proceeding, provided an order to show
cause has not been issued. Asylum shall be granted if the alien is a
and
refugee within the definition provided in [Section] 101(a)(42)(A)
149
his deportation or return is prohibited under [Section] 243(h).
This was a curious formulation, since it proposed that a grant of "asylum"
would depend not only on being a refugee, but also on the ability to satisfy
the American withholding of deportation test. The House version helpfully
deleted the reference to § 243(h), but inserted a much more devastating
limitation on access to asylum. Whereas the Senate had correctly understood
that being a refugee entails an international legal right to be protected, the
House of Representatives amended the provision to make the grant of asylum
an act of discretion, rather than an entitlement.15 0 As finally adopted, § 208(a)
therefore correctly identifies the beneficiary class simply as refugees, but
only allows a refugee " ... to apply for asylum in the discretion of the
Attorney General." This is a very strange outcome. On the one hand,
Congress expressly intended to " . . . insure a fair and workable asylum
policy which is consistent ... with [U.S.] obligations under international law,
and it feels it is both necessary and desirable that [U.S.] domestic law include
the asylum provision in the instant legislation." 1 5 1 Yet the means it chose to
implement that goal did not expressly link refugee status to any right to be
protected.
At a technical level, there is a plausible explanation. Because § 208(a)
addresses "asylum," which under U.S. law links to a right ultimately to apply
for permission to remain indefinitely in the United States, it may well have
been thought that there was no practical need to mandate protection. After all,
149.
150.
that

S. REP. No.96-256, at 9, 16(1979).
The § 208(a) language of the House version, adopted by the Conference Committee, provided

The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United
States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum,
and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A).
H.R. 2816, 96th Cong. § 208(a) (1979).
151. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, supra note 141, at 17-18.
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Article 34 of the Refugee Convention does not insist that states assimilate or
naturalize refugees, but simply calls on them to "as far as possible to
facilitate" these goals15 2 -a formulation quite consistent with a domestic
discretionary procedure. And if a refugee not granted discretionary asylum
were to be threatened with refoulement, he or she could, in the context of
removal proceedings, invoke Article 33 rights via the reformulated withholding of deportation rule. The possibility that the Supreme Court might
ultimately deny protection against refoulement to refugees (that is, to persons
able to prove a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason) is
unlikely ever to have occurred to members of Congress.
On balance, however, it appears that the congressional debates suffered
from a fundamental confusion regarding the nature of U.S. obligations under
the Refugee Protocol. The term "refugee" had never been used in U.S.
practice to refer to persons arriving in the United States to seek protection,
but was instead a label employed for persons being resettled into the United
States from overseas. Because the United States was slow to opt into the
international refugee protection regime, it developed a unique view that
"refugees" were persons admitted to the United States from abroad under
discretionary parole power, and later under § 203(a)(7). In contrast, persons
already in the United States and who were to be protected from removal due
to the risk of persecution under the § 243(h) withholding power were not
labeled as refugees, but simply as "aliens" who benefited from withholding,
or at best as "asylees."
Yet the purpose of the Refugee Act was to implement a treaty under which
the understanding of a "refugee" is the opposite. Persons voluntarily resettled from overseas are not refugees with rights under the Refugee
Convention or Protocol, but are essentially immigrants. No government has a
duty to admit them, and whatever admissions occur may be based on
whatever definitional construct a resettlement state opts to employ. Persons
genuinely at risk of persecution who arrive at the border of an asylum state, in
contrast, are refugees under international law, and are hence entitled to
protection. They may not lawfully be treated simply as the objects of
discretion.
In drafting the Refugee Act, neither the Executive nor Congress appears
clearly to have appreciated the distinction between the U.S. and international
notions of a "refugee." Instead, there was a general sense that accession to
the Protocol ought logically to compel the United States to conform its
overseas resettlement programs to international law. For example, "Congress
was told that the extant asylum procedures for refugees outside of the United
States [were] acceptable under the Protocol, except for the fact that it made
various unacceptable geographic and political distinctions.' 15 3 Because

152.
153.

Convention, supra note 10, at 176 (art. 34).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,434-35 (1987).
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"refugees" were understood to be persons under consideration for admission
from overseas, Congress determined that the primary class of refugees to be
resettled by the United States
would be selected on the basis of the Protocol's
54
definition of a refugee. 1
There is, of course, nothing wrong with the United States opting to tie its
overseas resettlement program to the international refugee definition. To the
contrary, this is an admirable form of internationalism, albeit one that is in no
sense legally compelled. The concern arose, however, when Congress
decided also to legislate in regard to the inland asylum system. Quite
appropriately, it did so by tying the new affirmative asylum system under
§ 208(a) to the international refugee definition. For the sake of simplicity, a
single provision, § 101(a)(42) of the INA, was enacted to serve as the
definitional standard for both overseas resettlement efforts under § 207 and
the new inland affirmative asylum procedure under § 208.155
This form of drafting, however, gave rise to confusion. Because § 101 (a)(42)
sets out the general definition of a refugee, and is specifically linked to both
overseas resettlement and eligibility for asylum, the fact that withholding of
deportation under § 243(h) is not comparably linked to § 101(a)(42) may be
thought to be legally significant. That is, since Congress expressly dictated
that the Protocol definition should govern efforts under § 207 and § 208, but
left § 243(h) open to "aliens" whose life or freedom would be threatened for
a Convention reason, a case might be made that Congress did not intend the
Protocol definition to be relied on for purposes of withholding deportation.
But in the context of the Refugee Act, this implication is countered by the fact
that Congress had clearly
indicated its intention to conform § 243(h) to
1 56
international refugee law.
Yet Congress' failure to link withholding of deportation to the § 101(a)(42)
standard seems nonetheless to justify a somewhat weaker implication. The
decision of Congress to rely on a common definition of "refugee" under
§ 101(a)(42) to govern the resettlement of refugees from abroad under § 207
and the protection of refugees in the United States under § 208 may indicate

154. In addition to Part "A"of the overseas refugee admission process (which relies on the Protocol
refugee definition), Congress has also enacted "Part B" under which persons within their own country and
who are persecuted for a Convention reason may be admitted "in such special circumstances as the
President after appropriate consultation [with the Congress].. may specify." See Martin, supra note 102,
at 102-03.
155. The Senate report on Bill S. 643 stated that "the new definition will bring U.S. law into
conformity with our international treaty obligations under the [Protocol]." S. REP. No. 96-256, supra note
149, at 4. The House report on Bill H.R. 2816 also emphasized that the new definition "will finally bring
U.S. law into conformity with the internationally-accepted definition of the term 'refugee' set forth in the
[Convention] and the Protocol, which our government ratified in 1968." H.R. REP,. No. 96-608, supra note
141, at 9.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48. It is important to recall that Congress merely
amended § 243(h) via the Refugee Act. The pre-existing form of words allowed an "alien" to seek
withholding of deportation, which language was simply not changed. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1976). The failure to amend language ought not to be equated to an affirmative decision to
include particular language for the purpose of deciding whether an implication of substance arises.
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that Congress really did not understand the nature of duties owed under the
Refugee Protocol. Because "refugees" under U.S. law had always been
conceived as the beneficiaries of discretion, it may be that Congress erroneously believed that persons seeking recognition of refugee status in the
United States under § 208 should, like their fellow members of the (U.S.defined) "refugee" class, be dealt with on a purely discretionary basis. Under
the House version of the Refugee Act, which ultimately prevailed, persons
able to meet the refugee definition are, of course, not entitled to insist on
to ask the Attorney
protection in the United States, but are merely authorized
57
General to exercise her discretionary authority. 1
If Congress believed that refugees arriving in the United States could be
legally assimilated to persons overseas seeking U.S. protection, then Congress was clearly wrong as a matter of international law. But this is a very
different allegation than the strong thesis that the absence of a statutory
linkage between § 101(a)(42) and § 243(h) reflects an intention of Congress
to withhold international rights, including to protection against refoulement,
from refugees. The implication is simply that Congress legislated poorly.
Because Congress was working from within a specifically American conceptual framework of refugees as the beneficiaries of discretion, rather than as
the holders of international rights, the Refugee Act did not follow through
comprehensively on its principled commitment to implement international
refugee law in U.S. law.
In the end, then, the Refugee Act of 1980 contained a smorgasbord of
poorly coordinated mechanisms related to the protection of refugees seeking
protection in the United States. Congress clearly recognized that the withholding mechanism had not in practice ensured U.S. compliance with international law. Yet there is no denying that Congress failed to take what would
arguably have been the most logical step to bring U.S. law into conformity
with international refugee law, namely the abandonment of the bifurcated
domestic system of withholding of deportation and asylum in favor of a
single, simple system in which all refugees, defined under the proper
standard, received the rights as spelled out in the Protocol. The inherent logic
a common legal duty appears never to
of a unified mechanism to implement
15 8
have been seriously considered.

157. This is not an internationally acceptable categorization. A group of persons defined under
international refugee law as a single category, "refugees," was, under U.S. law, divided into two
fundamentally different sub-categories. One sub-group (the members of which could show a well-founded
fear of persecution) was entitled to nothing more than the opportunity to seek an exercise of discretion,
whereas a second sub-group (composed of persons able to meet the higher standard for withholding of
deportation under § 243(h) of U.S. law) was entitled to assert a right to remain in the United States.
158. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-256, supra note 149, at 9 (noting that the new asylum procedure would
allow applicants the opportunity to have their claims considered outside a deportation proceeding,
"provided the order to show cause has not been issued" (emphasis added)). See also Anker & Posner,
supra note 97, at 40, regarding the debate during hearings in 1977 in which the extension of the
withholding provision to excludable aliens was discussed. The underlying assumption was that aliens who
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It is worth noting, however, that many congressional statements affirm a
desire to conform U.S. law to the Refugee Protocol,' 59 and no arguments
were made for the contrary position. The preponderance of evidence therefore suggests that Congress believed that it was acting to align U.S. and
international law, even though the last minute deliberations on the protection
of refugees physically present in the United States were not conducive to
maximal clarity of thought or drafting. As regards the most critical right of
refugees, protection against refoulement, there is nothing in the text of
§ 243(h).as approved by Congress that can be read to require an interpretation of the withholding provision in conflict with international law. The
legislative history, in other words, cannot be relied on to justify an interpretation of U.S. law that denies a right to protection from return to persons able to
show a "well-founded fear" of being persecuted. Nor does it provide a solid
foundation for a more general de-linkage of refugee status and refugee rights.
All in all, Congress legislated inadequa tely and sometimes incoherently. But
it most certainly did not legislate decisively to avoid U.S. duties under
international refugee law.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF REFUGEE RIGHTS
The Supreme Court defined the impact of U.S. accession to the Refugee
Protocol in its decisions in Stevic 160 and Cardoza-Fonseca.16' The net impact
of these key decisions was to conceive refugee protection in a way that does
not comport with American obligations under international law. The Protocol
defines a refugee in Article 1 as a person with a "well-founded fear of
persecution," and makes that standard the basis for entitlement to all the
rights enumerated in Articles 2 through 34, including to protection against
refoulement. 62 Despite the intention of both the Executive and Congress to
conform domestic law to international obligations, the Supreme Court in
Stevic and Cardoza-Fonsecaentrenched a system whereby being a "refugee" does not result in any entitlement to the very rights which the United
States bound itself to grant by accession to the Protocol. As the Court bluntly
opined,

"...

those who can only show a well-founded fear of persecution are

not entitled to anything, but are eligible for the discretionary relief of
asylum." 163

could benefit from the provision were somehow apprehended by the INS and were making a claim from a
defensive posture.
159. See supra notes 110-13, 146-48 and accompanying text. Note that Congress made it clear that the
United States was bound to apply Articles 2 through 34 of the Protocol, and that § 243(h) was to be read as
providing the protection of Article 33. Logically, therefore, § 243(h) should be read in reference to Article
I of the Refugee Convention, which defines refugees entitled to the benefit of Article 33 by means of the
"well-founded fear" of persecution standard. See supra notes 21-22, 64 and accompanying text.
160. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
161. 480U.S. 421 (1987).
162. See supra note 64-68; infra notes 203-07.
163. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 444.
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First, by interpreting the language of Article 33 in isolation from the rest of
the Protocol and instead by reference to U.S. agency practice, the Court in
Stevic found that there is no duty to grant protection against refoulement to
persons who meet the refugee definition. The Court focused on the fact that
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention requires states not to "expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened. .

. ."

64 as the basis for

validating the traditional U.S. rule limiting protection against removal to
persons able to demonstrate a probability of persecution in the destination
state. 165 Even though protection against refoulement textually inheres in a
"refugee" (without qualification based on level of attachment or otherwise),
and refugees are persons able to show a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted," the fact that Article 33 outlaws removal to territories where life
or freedom would be threatened was deemed by the Court a sufficient basis to
restrict Article 33 protection to super-refugees able to meet the United States'
INA § 243(h) probability-based standard for withholding of deportation.
The judgment in Cardoza-Fonseca,while commendable for its recognition that persons able to show a "reasonable possibility" (rather than a more
stringent probability standard) of persecution qualify as refugees,' 6 6 reinforced even more profoundly than Stevic the separation of U.S. refugee law
from the international regime. Even as it insisted upon respect for the
international evidentiary test of "well-founded fear," the Court in CardozaFonseca steadfastly refused to acknowledge the legal implications of being a
refugee under international law. Instead of finding that a person who meets
the definitional standard posited by the Court is entitled to the benefit of
Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention, the Supreme Court
determined that a refugee is entitled to nothing. A person able to show a
well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason is authorized to
seek discretionaryprotection through asylum from the Attorney General, but
has no legal claim to protection of any kind. The Cardoza-Fonsecacourt
even affirmed the holding in Stevic that protection against refoulement, which
textually is granted to a person who is a "refugee," is actually to be withheld
meet the probability-based superfrom refugees unless they are able1 6to
7
refugee test of U.S. withholding law.
By virtue of these two decisions, U.S. law guarantees only one refugee
right (to protection against refoulement) to only a subset of refugees (those
able to show a probability of persecution, rather than simply a well-founded
fear of persecution). In the eyes of the Supreme Court, refugees are no more
than supplicants, and even super-refugees are entitled to nothing more than

164. Convention, supra note 10, at 176 (art. 33(1)).
165. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussion of the standard of proof for
withholding of deportation under U.S. law).
166. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 440.
167. Id. at 423-24.
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the bare bones of protection against removal. The negotiability of refugee
rights suggested by this approach runs squarely counter to the 68obligations
which the United States undertook by accession to the Protocol.'
This is not to say that the opinions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonsecawere the
"original sins" that account for the muddled U.S. inland refugee determination system under which refugee status and refugee rights are not correlated.
As described in Part III, Executive representations to Senate upon accession
to the Protocol were inexact,1 69 and Congress did not draft the Refugee Act
with anything approaching maximal precision. 70 But the vigor with which
the Supreme Court seems to have strived for an interpretation of the Refugee
Act that is out of keeping with U.S. obligations under international law is
profoundly disturbing. The Supreme Court gave detailed, and often exaggerated, attention to any interpretive canon capable of reinforcing the peculiarity
of the American refugee system, and simultaneously gave short shrift to the
much more powerful case for interpreting the Refugee Act in consonance
with duties under the Protocol. This was not, in our view, simply a case of
judicial error. Rather, the decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonsecabetray a
determination to maximize the freedom of domestic tribunals operating
under domestic law, and a concomitant disinterest in truly understanding and
applying international law as law with dispositive effect.
A. Respectfor CongressionalIntent
The Supreme Court asserted that its understanding of refugee law was
firmly rooted in respect for the intentions of the legislators who enacted the
Refugee Act of 1980.171 The Court in Stevic began its analysis with the bold
statement that it was "plainly correct" that, by passing the Refugee Act,
"Congress intended to adopt a standard for withholding of deportation
claims by reference to pre-existing sources of law." 1 72 Similarly, the Court
declared in Cardoza-Fonsecathat the legislative history of the Refugee Act
made it "perfectly clear that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who
qualify as refugees to be coextensive with the class who qualify for § 243(h)
relief." 173

168. In Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), a more recent decision concerning
non-refoulement, the Court perpetuated the mistaken logic of Cardoza-Fonsecathat "refugees" are not
per se entitled to Article 33 protection.
169.

See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.

170. See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
171. This is, of course, a sensible starting point. Resorting to the legislative history "... helps a court
understand the context and purpose of a statute." Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848 (1992). More specifically, " ... the failure to use
appropriate legislative history as a basis for resolving a dispute over the meaning of an ambiguous statute
can be seen as opting for judicial dominance on the interpretive arena." ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESs 33 (1997).
172. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,414 (1984)
173. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 424.
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But as the analysis of the congressional record set out in Part III suggests,
there really was no basis for asserting that Congress gave any serious
attention to the specific means by which U.S. law should be aligned with
international refugee law. To the extent that Congress can truly be said to
have turned its attention to this issue, all that is clear is that Congress
intended the Refugee Act to bring U.S. law into compliance with its
international obligations, and was not satisfied that prevailing administrative
practice was sufficient to achieve that end. Yet the Supreme Court ignored
these general indications of a congressional intention to reform U.S. asylum
law in order to bring it into line with the international refugee regime.
Instead, it found that Congress had intended the new legislation to leave
undisturbed the traditional approach to protection under domestic U.S. law.
The Supreme Court was able to reach this startling result by failing to
conduct a fulsome examination of the congressional record during the
debates on ratification of the Protocol, or upon adoption of the Refugee Act.
In regard to two key issues, the Court moreover relied on decontextualized
extracts from the drafting history that do not provide an accurate appraisal of
the true history of the reform effort.
First, the Supreme Court invoked the Executive assurances that accession
to the Protocol would require no changes to domestic law 1 74 as the basis for
determining that pre-existing U.S. law and practice should govern U.S.
implementation of duties under the Protocol. In fact, however, the statements
of the Executive during the accession hearings simply made the point that
international standards could be readily accommodated within the existing
statutory structure, without the need for new legislation. 175 These statements
imply a recognition that current practice did not, in all particulars, comport
with international standards, but that changes could and would be made in the
regulations to reflect the new obligations. And while Congress did not
legislate a new, consolidated procedure for handling all inland refugee claims
as would arguably have been most desirable, neither did it say that administrative practice had or would constitute compliance with the Protocol.
Indeed, congressional efforts began almost immediately to amend U.S. law to
more clearly conform to international law by including a definition of
"refugee" that closely tracked the Protocol definition, and by limiting
administrative discretion over both overseas
admissions and the protection of
76
refugees arriving in the United States. 1
174. "The President and the Senate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with existing
law .... It was also believed that apparent differences between the Protocol and existing statutory law
could be reconciled by the Attorney General in administration and did not require any modification of
statutory language." Stevic, 467 U.S. at 417-18.
175. See, e.g., S. EXEC. Doc. No. 90-14, at 2 (1968) ("It is understood that the Protocol would not
impinge adversely upon the Federal and State laws of this country."); S. EXEC. Doc. No. 90-K, at 126
(1968) ("This article [33] is comparable to Sec. 243(h) of the [INA], and it can be implemented within the
administrative discretion provided by existing regulations."). See generally supra notes 114-21 and
accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussion of congressional efforts in 1969-70).
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Second, the Court took a key congressional statement out of context as
support for the proposition that refugees arriving in the United States had no
rights, but were simply the potential beneficiaries of Executive discretionary
protection.' 7 7 Because adoption of the Protocol's global refugee definition
for purposes of overseas resettlement programs meant that the United States
would no longer be able to limit its efforts to persons who originated in
particular regions of the world, there had been concern in Congress that the
proposed legislation might be overly ambitious. The House report rejected
this concern, indicating that the House Judiciary Committee had
...

carefully considered arguments that the new definition might

expand the numbers of refugees eligible to come to the [United States]
and force substantially greater refugee admissions than the country
could absorb. However, merely because an individual or group of
refugees comes within the definition will not guarantee resettlement in
the [United States]. The Committee is of the opinion that the new
definition does not create a new and expanded means of entry, but
instead regularizes and formalizes the
78 policies and the practices that
have been followed in recent years.'
The explicit language ("eligible to come to the [United States]," "will not
guarantee resettlement in the [United States]") makes clear that this passage
refers to the overseas admissions program. In the eyes of the Supreme Court,
however, this observation became evidence of an intention to deny rights to
refugees seeking protection in the United States,17 9 though domestic asylum
was not even under discussion by Congress when the remarks cited were
made.
B. Deference to the Board of ImmigrationAppeals
While the Court made much of the importance of honoring congressional
intentions in enacting the Refugee Act, its most serious preoccupation seems
in fact to have been upholding relevant positions taken by the BIA. Particularly in Stevic, the Court appears simply to have been exercising an extreme
form of ChevrontS0-derived deference to agency decision-makers.

177. See Stevic, 467 U.S. at417,426.
178. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 10 (1979).
179. "The Congress distinguished between discretionary grants of refugee admission or asylum and
the entitlement to a withholding of deportation if the § 243(h) standard was met." Stevic, 467 U.S. at 426
(emphasis added).
180. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The case
essentially established a two-step process for judicial review of agency interpretations of law. The first
step is to establish if congressional intent regarding the issue is clear; if so then the court and the agency
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent. If the court does not find that Congress has
directly addressed the precise issue at hand, however, the court must determine whether the agency's
interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. Interestingly, Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion in this case, as he did in both Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca.
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For example, the, Supreme Court drew heavily on agency practice after
(and even before) accession to the Protocol as a means of discerning
congressional intent in acceding to the Protocol and in drafting the Refugee
Act. The Court relied on the finding of the BIA in Matter of Dunar that
Congress intended that only persons able to meet the "clear probability of
persecution" standard traditionally relied on by the United States' 8' should
82
be granted protection against refoulement under the Refugee Protocol.1
Rather than reviewing the actual legislative history (which, as described
above, does not support the Board's conclusions1 83), the Supreme Court
assumed the Board's interpretation of history to be sound, and re-wrote
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention to conform to U.S. administrative
practice. The Court simply adopted the Board's view that because the
amended § 243(h) made no mention of the standard of proof necessary for
relief, or employed the term "refugee,"' ' 84 Congress had not intended to
change the prevailing U.S. approach.1 85 In the result, Congress must have
intended the "clear probability" standard to govern access to a right of
non-removal from the United States, even after adoption of the Refugee
86
Protocol's "well-founded fear" test.'
Similarly, the Court in Stevic was prepared to assume that the mandatory
duty of non-refoulement could be implemented through the discretionary
domestic vehicle of withholding of deportation because the BIA in Dunar
had reached that conclusion. 87 Because the Board was satisfied that no
claimant who had established a probability of persecution had ever been
denied relief, the discretionary nature of § 243(h) could be reconciled to the
mandatory requirement of Article 33 on a case-by-case basis.' 8 8 Even wfien
the Court recognized in Cardoza-Fonsecathat accession to the Protocol
required that § 243(h) be interpreted to impose a mandatory duty of
non-return,' 89 it was quite willing to assume that agency practice had in fact
changed to "hono[r] the dictates" of the Convention.' 90 The Court neither
fully examined the requirements of the Protocol as a whole, nor seriously

181.

Stevic, 467 U.S. at 419-20.

182.
183.
184.

Id. at418.
See supra notes 110-13, 141-44 and accompanying text.
See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421-22.

185. Id. at 428.
186. Id. at 430.
187. "The Board concluded that 'Article 33 has effected no substantial changes in the application of
section 243(h), either by way of burden of proof, coverage, or manner of arriving at decisions.' "Id. at 418.
188. "The Board observed that the Attorney General had consistently granted withholding under
§ 243(h) when the required showing was made." Id. at 419 n. 11.
189. In 1968, the United States agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2
through 34 of the [Convention] ....Article 33.1 of the Convention.. which is the counterpart of
§ 243(h) of our statute, imposed a mandatory duty on contracting States not to return an alien to a
country where his 'life or freedom would be threatened' on account of one of the enumerated
reasons.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,429 (1987).
190. Id.
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inquired whether the asserted compliance of § 243(h) with the dictates of
Article 33 was accurate.
While there is no doubt that Congress should have legislated more clearly
to conform domestic law to international law, the willingness of the Court to
defer so completely to agency practice makes no sense. Congress was
concerned to correct precisely the agency practice relied on by the Supreme
Court.' 91 It recognized that administrative and judicial decisions had held
that § 243(h) provided the protection required by Article 33, yet still thought
it necessary to amend the language of the section to conform with international law. Congress wanted the domestic provision to "clearly reflec[t] our
legal obligations under international agreements." 192 It seems disingenuous
in the extreme for the Court to have looked to agency practice as a source of
guidance on either congressional intent or appropriate forms or standards of
protection in view of the decade-long effort of Congress to codify legislation
that would bring U.S. law more fully into compliance with the Refugee
Protocol.
C. Concern About Subjectivity
The Court also seemed reluctant to accord even the right to protection
against refoulement to "refugees" on the grounds that refugee status, based
as it is on a "well-founded fear of being persecuted," sets an insufficiently
concrete test to serve as the basis for the allocation of rights. Because "the
reference to 'fear' in the § 208(a) standard obviously makes the eligibility
determination turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the
alien," 19 3 it was thought to lack the objective imperative that could justify
imposition of a duty on asylum states to provide protection. In contrast to the
refugee definition's focus on the applicant's subjective beliefs,' 94 the "would
be threatened" language of § 243(h) requires objective evidence of risk, and
therefore avoids the possibility that a government might be required to
protect a person simply on the basis of his or her personalized emotional

191. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
192. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, supra note 141, at 18. In view of this legislative history, deference to the
BIA was inappropriate on the basis of the Supreme Court's own reasoning:
The INS argues that the BIA's construction of the Refugee Act of 1980 is entitled to substantial
deference, even if we conclude that the Court of Appeals' reading of the statutes is more in keeping
with Congress' intent. This argument is unpersuasive.
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 445.
193. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 430. It appears that the argument of counsel for Stevic played a part in
encouraging this misunderstanding by the Court: "Respondent argues that the standards are not
coterminous and that the well-founded-fear-of-persecution standard turns almost entirely on the alien's
state of mind." Id. at 413.
194. "[T]he linguistic difference between the words 'well-founded fear' and 'clear probability' may
be as striking as that between a subjective and an objective frame of reference." Cardoza-Fonseca,480
U.S. at 431.
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reaction to less than serious risks of harm. The Court therefore determined
that it would be more reasonable to grant protection against refoulement only
to the subset of refugees able to meet the U.S. withholding provision's more
stringent definition of objective probability of persecution.
There is no historical basis, however, for the assertion that investigation of
a well-founded fear of persecution requires consideration of the applicant's
subjective mental state.1 95 The better view is that, like the French language
text, the word "fear" was used by the drafters of the Convention simply to
denote a well-founded forward-looking assessment of risk. The test is
therefore fundamentally objective. 19 6 Further, even those who continue to
argue that the expression "well-founded fear" imports consideration of the
applicant's subjective mental state do not suggest, as the Court seems to
imply, that the test is not anchored in objective analysis. 197 To the contrary,
the traditional understanding of the test is always expressed as requiring
consideration of both subjective fear and objective risk.1 98 Thus, if the
Supreme Court's concern was not to impose a duty on states to protect
persons whose fear was purely subjective, no restriction beyond the Convention definition itself, as incorporated in U.S. law via § 101(a)(42)(A), was
required.' 99

195.

See, e.g., Yusuf, [1991] Canadian Fed. Ct. App. Dec. No. A-1116-90 (unofficial translation):

It would be difficult to conceive the circumstances in which one might hold that a person who is
seeking refugee status is genuinely at risk of persecution, while still refusing the claim because the
fear is not subjectively internalized ....The refugee definition was certainly not conceived in
order to exclude courageous persons or those who are simply stupid, in order to benefit those who
are more easily frightened or more intelligent. Moreover, it is repugnant to imagine that one might
reject a claim to refugee status solely on the ground that the claimant, being a child of tender age or
a person suffering from a mental disability, was incapable of experiencing fear in relation to an
objectively well-established risk.
196.
197.

See HATHAWAY, supra note 45, at 66-75.
The UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 21,

37-38, states that

Since fear is subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in the person applying for
recognition as a refugee . .. To the element of fear-the state of mind and a subjective
condition-is added the qualification of 'well-founded.' This implies that it is not only the frame of
mind of the person concerned that determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must
be supported by an objective situation.
But note the confusion of the Supreme Court on this point: "That the fear must be 'well-founded' does not
alter the obvious focus on the individual's subjective beliefs .... Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 431.
198. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 21, 1 38 ("The term 'well-founded fear' therefore contains
a subjective and an objective element, and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements
must be taken into consideration.").
199. As observed in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, "[T]he Court gives short shrift to the words
'well-founded,' that clearly require some objective basis for the alien's fear." Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S.
at 459. Moreover, even if the Convention really did predicate refugee status on a purely subjective test
(which it does not), the Court offered no explanation of why it is that the United States should not grant the
rights attached to such status by a treaty it freely chose to ratify and incorporate into domestic law. Article
I of the Convention is not subject to-reservations by states. The United States as a state party would
therefore have no choice but to grant all Convention rights to persons so defined.

522
D.
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'PlainMeaning'andOther Canons of Construction

The Supreme Court's primary reliance on legislative history and the
interpretations rendered by the BIA was buttressed by reliance on a number
of traditional canons of statutory construction. 0° Of greatest importance, the
duty to interpret the words of a statute on the basis of their ordinary
meaning 2° 1 was invoked by the Court in Stevic to construe the standard for
withholding of deportation under § 243(h), which it assumed to be equivalent
to the duty of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
The Court observed that the claimant must prove "a likelihood of persecution," since the provision "literally provides for withholding

...

only if the

alien's life 'would' be threatened. ' 20 2 Thus, the Court found that refugees
only acquire a right to protection from removal under either U.S. or
international law when they face the probability of persecution in their home
country. This attempt to give force to the plain meaning of § 243(h) is flawed,
however, since the operative phrase is not "would," as the Court seemed to
think, but "would be threatened." That is, even if "would" denotes probabil-

200. In Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court relied on the principle that "where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 423,432 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). Thus, the Court held that
because the same Congress had enacted the § 208 asylum clause and the amended § 243(h) withholding of
deportation provision, yet had defined a textually less exigent standard of proof in the case of the former,
Congress must have intended to enact two different standards of proof to apply. A refugee (who could
show a "well-founded fear" of persecution) was eligible to receive asylum, even though only a
super-refugee (able to demonstrate a probability of harm) could claim withholding of deportation. There
is, however, an alternative explanation. As previously observed, the term "refugee" had traditionally been
used in the United States in a way that differed from its international legal meaning. See supra notes
154-55 and accompanying text. As David Martin has observed, "[a]lthough the two categories overlap in
some important respects and are rarely kept distinct in the popular conception of 'refugees,' lumping the
two together only generates unnecessary confusion." Martin, supra note 102, at 96. And in any event, it is
not entirely accurate to suggest that the same Congress enacted the two provisions. Withholding of
deportation had, of course, been available to the Executive long before the advent of the Refugee Act.
While the same Congress that established § 208(a) did amend § 243(h), it is doubtful that enactment of a
less than fully coordinated amendment can honestly be taken to signify an intention to establish two
completely distinct protective mechanisms.
A second canon of interpretation invoked by the Court was that Congress does not by implication enact
language it had earlier rejected. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 442-43. Thus, contrary to its earlier holding
in Stevic, the Court found in Cardoza-Fonsecathat Congress had rejected the Senate's draft language for
§ 208 because it did not want to restrict eligibility only to those who could meet the higher standard of
proof. In light of the legislative history of the Refugee Act, however, it is more plausible that the language
of the two sections merely tracked the language of Articles I and 33 of the Refugee Convention. The
policy argument the Court relied on in order to hold that § 208 requires a lower standard of proof than
§ 243(h) is misplaced, in any event, as that language pertained to the overseas admission procedure. Id. at
449-50 ("In enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 Congress sought to 'give the United States sufficient
flexibility to respond to situations involving political or religious dissidents and detainees throughout the
world.' " (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-608, supra note 141, at 9, discussing the inclusion in the refugee
definition persons with a well-founded fear of persecution who are still within their own countries)).
201. "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed ..."Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917).
202. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984). The possibility that the risks to "life or freedom" included in
Article 33 of the Convention might be a narrower notion that the "persecution" standard in Article I was
stated by the Court, but not relied upon. Id. at 428 n.22.
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ity, the test posited under international law is a probability of a threat, not the
probability of the harm itself.
Ironically, even as it sought to elucidate the "plain meaning" of § 243(h),
the Supreme Court seems not to have taken account of the fact that the
language of that domestic provision was drawn directly from Article 33 of
the Convention, not the reverse. If one were truly determined to understand
the meaning of words inserted by Congress into § 243(h), it would obviously
have made most sense to consider the original source of those words, and the
legal context from which they were extracted. Had the Supreme Court taken
this approach to application of the "plain meaning" doctrine, it would have
arrived at an understanding of "life or freedom would be threatened" that is
the equivalent of the notion of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted," not
with a probability of persecution.
This is because there is no basis to sustain the argument that the phrasing
of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention was meant to restrict the duty of
non-refoulement to a subset of Convention refugees. To the contrary, the
beneficiary class of Article 33 is defined simply as "refugees" without
qualification of any kind.2 °3 Apart from the restriction of rights based on a
refugee's level of attachment described earlier,2° there is moreover no right
in the Refugee Convention that is reserved for only a subset of persons who
meet the refugee definition of Article 1. If Article 33 were to have been an
exception to that general approach, one would certainly have expected to find
some reference in the travaux prparatoiresto a need to delimit the class of
beneficiaries. Yet over the course of lengthy and detailed discussion of
Article 33, there is not one such remark.
The Supreme Court seems also not to have noticed that language comparable to that employed in Article 33 is also found in Article 31 of the
Convention, pursuant to which states agree not to impose penalties for illegal
entry or presence

...

on refugees who... com[e] directly from a territory

where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1 ....
In this context, Paul Weis has observed that
[t]he words "where their life or freedom was threatened" may give the
impression that another standard is required than for refugee status in
Article 1. This is, however, not the case. The Secretariat draft referred to
refugees "escaping from persecution" and to the obligation not to turn
back refugees "to the frontier of their country of origin, or to territories
where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their
race, religion, nationality, or political opinions." In the course of
drafting the words "country of origin," "territories where their life or
203. "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
"....
Convention, supra note 10,
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
at 176 (art. 33(1)).
204. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
205. Convention, supranote 10, at 174 (art. 31(1)) (emphasis added).
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freedom was threatened" and "country in which he is persecuted" were
used interchangeably. The reference to Article 1 of the Convention was
introduced mainly to refer to the dateline of 1 January 1951 but it also
indicated that there was no intention to introduce more restrictive
criteria than that of "well-founded fear of persecution" used in Article
1(A)(ii). 2 ° 6

The "shorthand" language of Article 31 was therefore chosen simply in order
to avoid the need to repeat the whole of the refugee definition contained in
Article 1. While modestly more precise than the phraseology of Article 33
(because of the express allusion to Article 1 of the Convention), the language
of Article 31 was actually chosen in response to a recommendation by
UNHCR that Article 31 be framed in a way that mirrored the language of
20 7
Article 33's duty of non-refoulement!
It would therefore require an
extraordinary leap of faith to believe that the drafters really did intend to
restrict the class entitled to benefit from Article 33 in the way assumed by the
Supreme Court in Stevic.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
standard of proof required to benefit from protection against refoulement runs
directly counter to the overriding purpose of the Refugee Convention. The
goal of the Convention is " . . . to revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of
and the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new
agreement." ' 20 8 It pursues this objective by first defining a refugee in Article
1, and then enumerating the rights that follow from refugee status in Articles
2 through 34. If, as the Supreme Court suggests, a state party could
legitimately (pursuant to the Court's understanding of Article 33) deny entry
to all but the subset of refugees who face a probability (rather than a
well-founded fear) of persecution, just how would a state in practical terms
be in a position to guarantee the various enumerated rights to refugees (i.e.
those who simply show a well-founded fear of persecution) whom it has no
duty to admit? How, for example, would refugees attend public schools,
work, or benefit from rationing schemes in countries from which they are
excluded? And yet all of the duties set by the Convention (apart from Article
34) are clearly framed in the language of rights, and inhere in all persons able
to show no more than a "well-founded fear of persecution" in addition to
satisfaction of the stipulated level of attachment. It is, to say the least,
counterintuitive to suggest that the real meaning of Article 33 authorizes
governments to avoid many, perhaps most, of their freely assumed duties by
the simple expedient of forcing all but a subset of "super-refugees" away
from their borders. And if that had been their intention, why was so much

206.

PAUL WEiS, THE REFUGEE CONVENION, 1951, at 303 (1995).

207.
208.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR. 14, at 5 (1951) (statement of Mr. van Heuven Goedhart of UNHCR).
S. ExEc. Doc. No. 90-K, at 5 (1968).
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time and attention given to the articulation of the refugee definition in Article
1, and virtually no attention to the "would be threatened" language of Article
33, assuming the latter test to be the real definition of access to most refugee
rights?
In short, the Supreme Court's "plain meaning" construction of the
domestic counterpart to Article 33 runs counter to the general approach of the
Convention, under which rights inhere simply in "refugees," and are granted
or withheld only on the basis of level of attachment. There is moreover not an
iota of historical support for the Supreme Court's insistence that the drafters
wanted to limit Article 33 protection to the minority of refugees able to show
a probability of persecution (rather than a well-founded fear of persecution).
To the contrary, the drafting record supports the view that the language relied
upon by the Supreme Court was selected simply as a shorthand means of
incorporating the refugee definition in Article 1. And finally, the Supreme
Court's interpretation suggests that the whole treaty, although framed in the
language of legal rights, does not really bind governments to grant rights at
all, since state parties remain absolutely free to preclude the entry of most
persons to whom those rights are theoretically owed.
The alternative analysis, of course, is that the Supreme Court really gave
no serious attention at all to Article 33, relegating this fundamental international right to the rank of a troublesome (if malleable) upstart making an
untimely and essentially unwelcome appearance on the grand stage of
American law.
V. IN TRUTH, A

STORY OF CONTEMPT AND CONFUSION

The Supreme Court's decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonsecaderive in
part from a misreading of legislative history, and from contextually unwarranted deference to erroneous holdings of the BIA. But we believe that these
judgments also bespeak two more important concerns. First, the Supreme
Court was not willing to take international law seriously, even though there
was absolutely no doubt that the legislation under consideration was intended
to implement U.S. duties under a duly ratified international treaty. Second
and more significantly, the Court appears to have been determined to avoid
any finding that refugees could be the holders of rights. Perhaps because
refugees as traditionally conceived under U.S. law are barely distinguishable
from the broader category of immigrants, the Supreme Court steadfastly

insisted that refugees remain only potential beneficiaries of administrative
discretion. Taken together, these concerns amount to a rejection by the Court
of substantive American participation in the international refugee law regime.
A.

Whatever Happened to Charming Betsy?

For all of its apparent concern to observe relevant canons of statutory
interpretation, it is extraordinary that the Supreme Court's decisions in Stevic
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and Cardoza-Fonseca make no mention of the principle of construction
enunciated in Schooner Charming Betsy.2 ° 9 In that case, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed 21to
0
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.,
Specifically, a court ought to give effect to a congressional violation of
international law only if convinced that the violation was intentional, and not
unthinking or haphazard. Absent a clear statement of congressional intent to
a
override international law or solid grounds to impute such an intention,
2E
,
law.
international
of
violation
a
avoid
to
interpreted
be
statute should
Yet rather than seeking to reconcile the Refugee Act to international law,
the Supreme Court's decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca evince a
determination to distance U.S. asylum law from its international progenitor.
The Supreme Court's antipathy towards international refugee law as a source
of obligation is perhaps most obvious in its extraordinary effort to avoid
recognizing a duty to protect refugees from refoulement. The Court found it
telling that even after passage of the Refugee Act, § 243(h) of the INA does
not grant protection to a "refugee," but rather to "any alien" who would face
persecution. 21 2 As a matter of plain language, the Court held that this failure
of Congress to specify that withholding of deportation is a right that accrues
to "refugees" must mean that it is not necessarily a right held by all refugees
21 3
(but only by persons able to meet the specific requirements of § 243(h)).
Yet Congress clearly expressed its intention that § 243(h) should conform
to the requirements of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention,2 14 which is a
right that inheres in all Convention refugees. 2' 5 Rather than seeking to
understand the meaning of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention by resort to
established rules of treaty interpretation, the Supreme Court was driven by an
uncompromising determination to construe the duty of non-refoulement in
accordance with prevailing American law. Its point of departure was therefore the language of § 243(h) of the INA. The Court acknowledged that
Congress had amended the traditional test for withholding of deportation
upon passage of the Refugee Act (from "would be subject to persecution" to
"life or freedom would be threatened") so that " . . . U.S. statutory law
2 16
But
clearly reflects our legal obligations under international agreements."
be
would
or
freedom
his
life
("where
because Article 33 contains language
threatened") capable of bearing the traditional U.S. insistence on a showing
of a probability of persecution, this meaning was attributed to it. Indeed, the
Court quickly abandoned any pretense of taking the Refugee Convention

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
Id. at 118.
See generally Steinhardt,infra note 227, at 1167.
See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,422 (1984).
Id.
See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68, 203-208 and accompanying text.

216.

Stevic, 467 U.S. at 426 n.20 (citing H.R. REP.No. 96-608, at 17-18 (1979)).
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seriously as a source of obligations, confining its discussion of the standard
of proof under both Article 33 and § 243(h) to an interpretation of the
domestic statutory language alone: "Section 243(h), both prior to and after
amendment, makes no mention of the term 'refugee'; rather, any alien within
the United States is entitled to withholding if he meets the standard set
2 7

forth."

1

The Supreme Court seems never to have considered the possibility that
Article 33, as part of an international treaty, was undoubtedly framed to
achieve goals other than conformity with American domestic law. The Court
in Stevic proceeded to overturn the "mistaken premise" of the Second Circuit
that would have reinterpreted § 243(h) to grant withholding of deportation to
all refugees, erroneously declaring that there was "no support for this
conclusion in either the language of § 243(h), the structure of the amended
Act, or the legislative history."' 21 8 By the miracle of superimposition of
American law onto the text of Article 33, the duty of non-refoulement was
owed only to a subset of refugees, namely those who "would be threatened"
if returned.2 19 In essence, the Court held that since domestic law had always
been in basic compliance with international law, and since the Refugee Act
was enacted only to regularize a few discrepancies between international and
domestic law, then ipso facto international law should be interpreted in
accordance with American domestic standards.2 2 °
As serious as the Court's erroneous definition of the class of persons
entitled to protection against return to the risk of persecution undoubtedly is,
the more general failure to see the linkage between refugee status and
substantive rights under the Convention is more profoundly disturbing. In
Stevic, the Court at least recognized that "[t]he Protocol bound parties to
comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of [the
Convention].", 2 21 Yet in Cardoza-Fonseca,the Court seemed quite willing to
overlook the duty of the United States to ensure that refugees benefit from
these rights, holding instead that " ... a finding that an alien is a refugee does no

217. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at428.
219. Id. "In essence, Stevic permits prior non-conforming domestic law to operate as an unstated
reservation to the Protocol." Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 7.
220. Subsequent cases demonstrate that courts have accepted the Supreme Court's characterization of
domestic law as conforming to international law. See, e.g., Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 198 (3d Cir.
1996) ("[Tlhe Refugee Act brought the domestic laws of the U.S. into conformity with its treaty
obligations under the [Protocol] .... Thus, the Refugee Act was enacted to fulfill our treaty obligations
under the U.N. Protocol for the benefit of aliens . .. who claim to be fleeing persecution in their
homelands."); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Despite some concerns
that the 'clear probability' standard may have been changed by the United States' 1968 accession to the
[Protocol] and by certain provisions of the Refugee Act, this standard has been reaffirmed as the proper
one for determining the applicant's burden under section 243(h)."); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d at
513 n.3 ("The [UNHCR] Handbook contains standards for interpreting the [Protocol], to which the United
States acceded in 1968, and which informed Congress' actions when it passed the Refugee Act in 1980.
That Act amended our immigration laws so as to bring United States law into conformity with
international law.").
221. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416.
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more than establish that 'the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of
the Attorney General' . ..,

".

Indeed, "those who can only show a well-

founded fear of persecution are not entitled to anything, but are eligible for
the discretionary relief of asylum.", 223 This conclusion is simply wrong. The
explicit reference in Stevic to the catalogue of refugee rights in Articles 2
through 34 moreover makes it clear that the Court knew that refugees were
not merely the objects of discretion. We believe that this is an important
the Court's
point, as there might otherwise be an inclination to dismiss
2 24
holdings simply as uninformed in regard to international law.
To the contrary, in both Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca,the Supreme Court
was fully briefed on relevant international law.2 25 The Court had before it the
amicus curiae briefs of UNHCR, in which the history and authoritative
interpretations of international refugee law were developed and thoroughly
explained. 2 6 And in any event, the ability of the Supreme Court to draw from
international refugee law when so inclined is clear from the internationally
derived understanding of "well-founded fear" which it adopted in Cardoza-

222.
223.
224.

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5 (1987).
Id. at 444.
See, e.g., Helton, supra note 136, at 2346:

[J]udicial reticence stems more from a general unfamiliarity with the law of international human
rights and a parochial legal tradition suspicious of the international law making processincluding its relation to the customary international law of human rights. In order to realize the
mandate to protect the human rights of aliens and refugees, courts must become more knowledgeable about the substance of international legal doctrine. But just as importantly, courts must
develop greater awareness of, and sensitivity to, the development and authority of international
law. Such regard by the judiciary will assist the United States in attaining full compliance with the
law of nations.
225. Interestingly, the Court was quite prepared to engage in analysis of the drafting history of Art.
32(1) of the Convention in order to demonstrate that Stevic was not "lawfully in the territory" of the
United States and was therefore not entitled to the benefit of the Convention's protection against
expulsion. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 417 n. 10.
226. In its amicus brief for Stevic, the UNHCR stated that:
to require of an applicant for refugee status or for withholding of deportation to prove that
persecution is 'more likely than not' would result in a standard more stringent than the term
'well-founded fear' as that phrase is used in the 1951 Convention ....To ignore the element of
fear and to require an applicant to show that he would most probably be persecuted is to apply a
definition of 'refugee' which is not contained in or implied by the 1951 Convention or the 1967
Protocol, and which does not correctly reflect the obligations of a State Party under either of these
instruments.
Brief for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at 25-2.6, INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407 (1984). UNHCR reiterated this basic point in its brief for Cardoza-Fonseca:
[T]he term 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' means that an applicant for refugee status need
only be able to show good reason why he or she fears persecution .... 'Good reason' for fear,
rather than proof of a particular degree of probability of being persecuted, is all that is required by
international law ....In using the term 'well-founded fear of being persecuted,' the framers of the
1951 Convention adopted a definition which corresponds to the practical realities of the refugee
situation.
Brief for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at 26-28, INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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Fonseca.2 27 The failure to inform its interpretations of the Refugee Act by
drawing on the international refugee law being implemented is therefore
more plausibly a matter of disinclination than of unawareness or ineptitude.
Ralph Steinhardt has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in
Cardoza-Fonseca"suggest[s] a broad endorsement of international principle
in the interpretation of statutes ... Cardoza-Fonsecareaffirms the propriety

of consulting nonjurisdictional, international standards in the interpretation
of domestic statutes."- 22 8 At one level, this is clearly true. Even though the
congressional intent to conform U.S. and international refugee law was not
stated in the Refugee Act itself, but is clear only from its drafting history, the
Court insisted that "well-founded fear" be defined to coincide with the
travaux prparatoiresand dominant international interpretations, even at the
expense of the traditional U.S. standard of proof:
Indeed, the definition of "refugee"

that Congress adopted ...

is

virtually identical to the one prescribed by... the Convention .... Not
only did Congress adopt the Protocol's standard in the statute, but there
were also many statements indicating Congress' intent that the new
statutory definition of "refugee" be interpreted in conformance with the
Protocol's definition ....

It is thus appropriate to consider what the

phrase "well-founded fear" means with relation to the Protocol.2 29
But the Court's commitment to implementation of international law is clearly
selective.2 30 Not only did the Cardoza-Fonsecacourt not follow the same
internationalist approach when it came to addressing the status of Articles 2
through 34 of the Convention, but the Supreme Court's subsequent refugee
caselaw, in particular the decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,231
232
borders on outright hostility towards international law.

227.

After reviewing the history of the drafting of the Convention, the Court concluded that:

[t]he standard, as it has been consistently understood by those who drafted it, as well as those
drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly does not require an alien to show that it is more
likely than not that he will be persecuted in order to be classified as a 'refugee.'
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 438.
228.

Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a Canonof Domestic Statutory Construction,

43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1153-54 (1990).
229. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 437.
230. Steinhardt sees the reluctance of the courts to rely on international law as part of a
debate.., about supremacy and politics: those who reject the determinative power of international
law principles--or some substantial subclass of them-in domestic litigation argue that the
coercive power of law can be justified only if it reflects the political will of those to whom it
applies. By assertion, international law fails this test because it arises out of a relatively vague and
varying diplomatic process among states.
Steinhardt, supra note 229, at 1107-08.
231. Sale, 509 U.S. 155 (permitting the return of refugees intercepted on the high seas without
investigation as to their circumstances).
232. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & JoHN A. DENT, REFUGEE RIGHTS: REPORT ON A COMPARATIVE SURVEY
10-12 (1995).
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Had the Supreme Court's analysis of the Refugee Act been informed by
the Charming Betsy principle, it is more likely that it would have at least seen
§ 243(h) as tied into the definition of "refugee" and therefore subject to a less
strict standard of proof.233 More generally, it would have been impossible for
the Court not to have recognized that refugees are the holders of rights, rather
than simply the potential beneficiaries of discretionary asylum. Instead, the
Supreme Court seems to have relied on any interpretive principle and shred
of evidence capable of effectively nullifying the overriding goal of Congress
to bring U.S. law into conformity with international refugee law. It is difficult
to contest Joan Fitzpatrick's rather depressing conclusion:
This selective approach may got be entirely deliberate, but it suggests
unease at the prospect that judicial enforcement of clear international
norms might restrict the flexibility of the political branches. Such an
attitude is fundamentally at odds with acceptance of international law
as a constraint on policy choices and a limit on government freedom to
deal as it pleases with individuals possessing rights under international
agreements ....

Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca, by suggesting that

Congress was insincere or ineffectual in bringing the nation fully into
with international refugee law, have had a corrosive efcompliance
234
fect.

In other words, the Supreme Court was determined to save Congress from
itself. The Court emphatically declared that "[i]f one thing is clear from the
legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire
1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United
States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Proto' ' 236 a
235 Equally pointedly, the Court rejected as "unpersuasive
col ....
government contention that it should defer to the BIA's reading of Congress'
intent. Yet in fact, the decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonsecaadopt agency
reconstructions of congressional history which relegate international refugee
law to the sidelines.

233. The lack of evidence for a different standard of proof under Articles 33 and 34 of the Convention
is made in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion:
In any event, the materials discussed by the Court shed little light on the question presented by this
case. None of them states that the burden of proof for non-refoulement under Article 33.1 of the
United Nations Protocol of 1967 - a remedy essentially identical to withholding of deportation
under § 243(h) of the Act - is higher than the burden of proof for asylum under Article 34. The only
thing the materials tend to establish is that a mathematical approach to the likelihood of
persecution in asylum cases is arguably inconsistent with the sense of the drafters of the Protocol.
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 464 (Powell, J., dissenting). While Justice Powell would have affirmed BIA
practice on the burden of proof, his decision is nonetheless accurate as regards the absence of any support
for a bifurcated burden of proof under international law.
234. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 8-9.
235. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 436.
236. Id. at 445.
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B. Refugees Are Immigrants,Aren't They?
A second fundamental concern with the Supreme Court's reasoning is that
it seems inextricably anchored in an understanding of refugees as no more
than a sub-category of immigrants. That is, there is virtually nothing in the
reasoning of the Court in either Stevic or Cardoza-Fonsecarecognizing that,
in contrast to other persons who may wish to enter the United States, refugees
are uniquely entitled to insist that the United States protect them. Their status
as refugees endows them with a right not to be returned to the risk of
persecution, and to benefit from the full catalogue of civil and socioeconomic
rights set out in the Refugee Convention.2 37 Other than by formal reservation, it is not open to the United States, or any other state party, simply to
decide that refugees will not receive the benefit of Articles 2 through 34.
The Government of the United States was aware that becoming a party to
the Protocol meant that it was undertaking a duty to protect persons
previously not entitled to enter this country, including by affording them at
least temporary residence in the United States. This is clear not only from
representations made to the Senate during the accession debate,2 38 but from
the fact that the United States made precisely two fairly minor reservations
upon accession to the Protocol.2 39 Because the United States clearly turned
its attention to the issue of terms of accession, it must have been aware that
neither the refugee definition in Article 1, nor the duty of non-refoulement set
by Article 33, is subject to reservation.2 40 There is, therefore, no basis upon
which the United States can sustain an argument that it may return all but
super-refugees able to meet the specifically American withholding of deportation standard, much less that it may elect to treat refugees as entitled to no
more than protection in the discretion of the Attorney General. Yet the
Supreme Court, echoing comparable assumptions by Congress and others,
seems not to have fully understood the specificity of the rights of refugees. It
saw refugees as immigrants, subject to many, if not all, of the usual legal
strictures that the United States and other countries impose on the admission
and reception of non-citizens generally.
In part, the assimilation of refugees to immigrants for purposes of rights
allocation derives from the definitional confusion previously discussed.2 4 '
Whereas "refugees" under traditional U.S. law were persons admitted on a
discretionary basis from abroad, refugees under international law are persons
with a well-founded fear of persecution who arrive at a state's territory, and
who are entitled by law to protection. As Joan Fitzpatrick has written:

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See generally supra Part II.
See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 11.
See Convention, supra note 10, at 182 (art. 42(1)).
See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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Confusion arises because Congress chose to adopt the same textual
definition of "refugee" under INA § 207 that it incorporated into INA
§ 208. Those entering under INA § 207 [and who have applied from
abroad] are given the legal status of "refugee." Yet while every
"asylee" under INA § 208 [who applied in the United States, or at its
border] must prove that he or she meets the Convention definition of
"refugee," fewer than 20 [percent] of the recent beneficiaries of INA
§ 207 meet that definition .... INA § 207 is a highly politicized
humanitarian admissions program. Without denigrating humanitarianism, one may regret the misappropriation of the refugee concept. The
obvious political nature of INA § 207 increases the danger that asylum
will also fall outside the rule of law and lose its close congruence with
international norms.24 2
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonsecafell into precisely this trap,
construing the common textual definition of a "refugee" in § 101(a)(42) as
one that "applies to all asylum relief ...[including] to the old § 203(a)(7)
[which governed resettlement from abroad]." 243
The confusion is most clearly evident in the mistaken belief that the United
States was required to re-work its overseas refugee resettlement programs in
order to conform to the requirements of the Protocol. While it is true that
Convention refugees brought to the United States remain refugees and hence
entitled to refugee rights once here, there is no duty under international
refugee law to reach out to persons not already inside, or at the frontiers of,
one's own country. Such voluntary efforts are simply not compelled or
regulated by the Convention and Protocol. The decisions in Stevic and
Cardoza-Fonseca,however, suggest a perception on the part of the Court that
U.S. accession to the Protocol had something to do with the admission of
refugees from abroad.
For example, in Stevic, the Court insisted that U.S. law prior to the
Refugee Act was in compliance with international law. This was so because
"[o]ur definition of a 'refugee' under § 203(a)(7) [governing overseas
resettlement] was of course consistent with the Protocol. Indeed, the relevant
statutory language virtually mirrored the Protocol definition." 244 This conflation of overseas resettlement with the implementation of legal duties to
refugees is even more clear in Cardoza-Fonseca, in which the Supreme
Court observed that "Congress was told that the extant asylum procedure for
refugees outside of the United States was acceptable under the Protocol,
except for the fact that it made various unacceptable geographic and political

242. Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 11-12.
243. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 436 n.18 (emphasis added). "Prior to the 1980 amendments there
was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United States. Asylum for
aliens applying for admission from foreign countries had, however, been the subject of a previous
statutory provision ...." Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
244. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407,428 n.22 (1984).
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distinctions., 245 In fact, there was no reason to be concerned about whether
U.S. overseas resettlement efforts were based on the Protocol's refugee
definition. In the usual American way of thinking, however, a U.N. treaty
about refugees must be addressing "refugees" as understood under U.S. law,
namely those seeking resettlement.
It was a short step from the innocent, if legally unfounded, belief that
refugee law governs overseas admissions to the less benign view that
refugees arriving in the United States could, like other "refugees" resettled to
the United States, be dealt with solely on the basis of administrative
discretion. If the law was now to recognize a class of refugees seeking
protection by coming directly to the United States, the status of new refugees
would logically be assimilated to that of resettled "refugees."
The legal mechanism by which this synthesis was achieved was Article 34
of the Convention, pursuant to which state parties agree to "as far as possible
facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.", 246 While there is
no apparent reason to see this one right, out of the whole catalogue of rights
in the Convention, as uniquely applicable to refugees (of both kinds), that is
precisely the view taken by the Court. The Stevic court simply proclaimed
without any reasoning that "[t]wo of the substantive provisions of the
Convention are germane to the issue before us ... Article 33.1

..

. and Article

34 . ... ,,247 In Cardoza-Fonseca,it was equally baldly asserted that "[t]he
[INA's] establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a
discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a
statutory right not to be deported to the country in which they are in danger,
mirrors the provisions of the [Protocol] ..... ,248 This is so because "[s]ec'
tion 208(a)... corresponds to Article 34. 249

245. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 at 434-35. As this quotation suggests, the Executive was equally
misinformed about the applicability of the Protocol to procedures by which refugees were resettled from
abroad. Indeed, remarks of the Court suggest that the lawyers representing Stevic were also confused in
this regard:
Respondent understandably does not rely upon the specific textual changes in § 243(h) in support
of his position that a well-founded fear of persecution entitles him to withholding of deportation.
Instead, respondent points to the provision of the Refugee Act which eliminated the ideological
and geographical restrictions on admission of refugees under § 203(a)(7) and adopted an expanded
version of the United Nations Protocol definition of "refugee."
Stevic, 467 U.S. at 422.
246. Convention, supra note 10, at 176 (art. 34).
247. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416-17. The notion that the Refugee Convention calls for a bifurcated system
based on Articles 33 and 34 is also embraced by the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca:
The Act's establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of
asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the
country where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol [r]elating
to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of
1980.
Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 424.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 441.
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As a matter of international law, this is wrong. Refugees who are under a
state's jurisdiction are entitled to all the rights stipulated in Articles 2 through
34, not just Article 34. And refugees who remain abroad, but who seek
resettlement, are not entitled to assert any of the rights in the Convention in
relation to the overseas state. But if refugees physically present in the United
States are instead deemed part of a common class with persons to be resettled
from abroad under discretionary initiatives (which they should not), and if
the Protocol regulates overseas resettlement (which in fact it does not), then
logically the only provision of the Protocol that can be safely applied to the
combined group of "refugees" as a whole is the largely hortatory Article 34.
This failure to recognize refugees seeking protection in the United States
as fundamentally distinct from the broader class of discretionary beneficiaries of resettlement has effectively disentitled refugees in the United States
from the benefit of Articles 2-33 of the Convention. As the Court observed,
"Article 34 merely call[s] on nations to facilitate the admission of refugees to
the extent possible; the language of Article 34 [is] precatory and not
self-executing., 250 Thus, " . . . the Attorney General is not required to grant
251 and even those
asylum to everyone who meets the definition of refugee,'
refoulement.25 2
granted asylum are not guaranteed protection against
In short, refugees do not get refugee rights. Refugees are simply a category
of would-be immigrant, who like all would-be immigrants must seek permission to come in and be content with whatever entitlements the host state is
prepared to offer. Whereas international refugee law is predicated on the
arriving at
extension of at least temporary membership rights to all refugees
253
duty.
such
any
rejects
vision
one's borders, the Supreme Court's
VI.

WHY THE SUPREME COURT ERROR MATTERS

Notwithstanding all of these indications that the Supreme Court fundamentally erred by failing to recognize the entitlements that flow from refugee
status in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca,there has been a tendency to dismiss
2 54
the problem as raising few practical risks. Though technically discretionary, there is in fact what amounts to a presumption in U.S. law that those who
250. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428 n.22.
251. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 428 n.5.
252. "Article 33.1 requires that an applicant satisfy two burdens: first, that he or she be a refugee...
second, that the 'refugee' show that his or her life or freedom 'would be threatened' if deported." Id. at
440-41.
253. On the often devastating implications in Supreme Court jurisprudence of being deemed a
"non-member" alien, see, for example, Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the
Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REv. 707 (1996); Victor Romero, Expanding the Circle of
Membership by Reconstructing the 'Alien': Lessons from Social Psychology and the 'Promise Enforcement'Cases, 32 MICH. J. LAW REFORM 1 (1998).
254. Fitzpatrick states:
[T]he practical impact of the gap between Convention Article 33 and the U.S. provision on
withholding of deportation is minor. Few asylum adjudicators are prepared to make an explicit
finding that a claimant should be deported to a country in which he or she faces a well-founded fear
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meet the Convention refugee definition should be granted asylum.25 5 While
asylum is not specifically predicated on the guarantees enumerated in
Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention, it nonetheless delivers most of what
the Convention demands. There is therefore a belief that there is no practical
imperative to contest the admittedly legally inaccurate approach set in
motion by the Court.
We take the view, in contrast, that present U.S. law cannot be relied upon
dependably to deliver Convention rights to persons who meet the Convention's "well-founded fear of persecution" standard. This is most obviously
true in the decision to deny protection against refoulement to such persons.
Equally important, the failure of the Court clearly to link Convention refugee
status with an entitlement to Convention rights has opened the door to a
domestic legislative program that purports to withhold asylum (as defined in
U.S. law) from persons who are Convention refugees (under international
law).
Notwithstanding the presumption that refugees are to be granted asylum, 256 the INA interposes bars on access to asylum for reasons not
authorized by the Convention. Indeed, the Attorney General is granted the
continuing authority to define additional grounds for the refusal of asylum.2 5 7
To the extent this prerogative is exercised, a gap may be created between
Convention refugee status and eligibility for asylum under U.S. law. Because
the Court's decisions in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonsecahave inaccurately held
that refugee status itself does not entitle an individual in the United States to
claim Convention rights, refugees subject to one of the specifically U.S.
ineligibility criteria are denied protection to which they are entitled as a
matter of international law. Deborah Anker has similarly noted that "exclusion from protection is an area in which U.S. and international law diverge
significantly," in that "U.S. law renders ineligible for asylum and withholding broader classes of persons than the Convention excludes from refugee
25 8
status."
Many of the U.S. ineligibility criteria mirror grounds for cessation of, or
exclusion from, refugee status under Article I (C)-(F) of the Refugee Convention. 9 Imposition of an eligibility bar on these terms clearly raises no
concern. Other ineligibility criteria rely upon the right of states to expel
certain particularly dangerous refugees under Articles 32 and 33(2) of the

of persecution, simply because of negative discretionary factors combined with a failure to satisfy
withholding's higher evidentiary threshold.
Fitpatrick, supra note 14, at 8-9.
255. See In re Pula, 19 1. & N. Dec. 467,473 (BIA 1987).
256. See supra notes 33-33 and accompanying text.
257. See INA § 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C) (1994 & 1997 Supp.).
258. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 415-16 (3rd ed. 1999).
259. For example, both U.S. law and the Refugee Convention would allow the denial of status to
persons who engaged in the persecution of others or who were firmly resettled elsewhere.
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Convention.2 60 There is some concern here, since persons within the scope of
these articles are Convention refugees, even though they may legitimately be
removed from the United States. The decision to bar some such persons from
even making a claim to asylum denies them recognition as refugees, which
may adversely affect their ability to access UNHCR institutional protection,
or make it more difficult for them to invoke refugee rights in relation to
another state party in which their presence does not pose a comparable risk.
But it cannot be said that the U.S. eligibility bars premised on these grounds
raises the specter of non-compliance with duties under the Refugee Convention.
In contrast, reliance on at least two of the bars to asylum may lead
adjudicators to act in contravention of treaty obligations. A particularly
troubling deviation from international law is the U.S. provision that bars an
applicant from being considered for asylum or withholding of deportation on
the basis of "terrorist activity." The law covers those who have engaged in,
or about whom there are reasonable grounds to believe they are engaged in,
or who have incited, terrorist activity, as well as those acting as representatives of designated terrorist organizations. 26 ' The Refugee Convention, in
contrast, requires much greater precision before exclusion from refugee
status may be contemplated. States are required to show that the "terrorist"
actions engaged in are properly deemed crimes against humanity, serious
non-political crimes, or acts contrary to the principles and purposes of the
United Nations.262 Each of these standards has relatively clear international
meaning, unlike the murky concept of "terrorism., 26 3 Because refugee
status is uniformly defined in international law, it is simply not open to the
United States to establish an additional ground of disqualification defined in
purely domestic terms.
While many "terrorist" activities will in fact fall under one of the
stipulated international standards,2 6 the barring of "representatives of terrorist organizations" will not. At the very least, there is an obligation under
international law to show why the particular person whose claim is under
consideration represents a threat to American national security, in consequence of which removal may be lawful under Refugee Convention Articles
32 and 33(2). These articles do not sanction a denial of protective responsibility on the grounds of an applicant's formal status as a member of an
organization, but only on the basis of his actual threats or actions. Because
260. For example, U.S. provisions for the denial of protection to persons who pose a danger to the
security of the United States are likely consistent with Articles 32 and 33(2).
261. See INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(v) & 241(b)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) & 1251(b)(3)(B)
(Supp. III 1998).
262. See Convention, supra note 10, at 156 (art. I(F)).
263. See generally PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN, THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE (1999); JAMES C. HATHAWAY &
COLIN J.HARVEY, FRAMING REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE NEW WORLD DISORDER (forthcoming).

264. But the recent effort to bar six Iraqi opponents of President Sadam Hussein shows that the U.S.
may exercise its domestic authority to bar asylum claims unlikely to fall under one of the exclusions
contemplated by Article 1(F) of the Convention. See ANKER, supra note 258, at 443.
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the most vital interests of refugees are involved, particularized refoulement
under Article 33(2) is authorized only after a careful and balanced assessment
of the security threat posed by the refugee. A restrictive approach is clearly
called for,2 65 with the state asserting the right to expel a refugee bearing the
burden of persuasion.
A second and related concern is the U.S. statutory bar to relief for an
applicant who, having been convicted of a "particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of the United States.", 26 6 On the
surface, this authority appears unobjectionable, as it essentially replicates
Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, pursuant to which protection
against refoulement may not be claimed by a refugee"

. .

. who, having been

convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of [the receiving] country." However, recent
amendments to the INA have unfortunately collapsed the international
two-part test for permissible refoulement under Convention Article 33(2) into
a single, categorical bar. Under the international standard, conviction by final
judgment of a particularly serious crime is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for removal. The Convention drafters did not conceive of expulsion as punishment for such criminality, but instead only as a "last resort"
where there is no alternative mechanism to protect the community in the
country of asylum from an unacceptably high risk of harm.2 67 The right to
expel a refugee under Article 33(2) is therefore contingent not only on the
fact of final conviction for a particularly serious crime, but also on a showing
by the state of refuge that the continued presence of the refugee in its territory
would be dangerous for its community. Thus, a state that wishes to avail itself
of this highly exceptional authority must avoid categorical assumptions, and
ground its decision to expel the refugee on a clear appraisal of the real risks to
its community posed by the refugee's continued presence.
In the United States, however, there is now a regulatory bar to asylum and
withholding of deportation 2 68 that avoids the necessity to engage in any such

265. "Considering the serious consequences of exclusion for the person concerned.. .the interpretation of these exclusion clauses must be restrictive." UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 21, 149.
266. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1998). "Since the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1990, the United States has taken the position that it may define a set of crimes as
'particularly serious' and summarily deny both asylum and withholding of removal to any person
convicted of such crimes. UNHCR has argued that such aperse bar to refugee protection is contrary to the
case-by-case approach to refugee status determination which, in its view, the Convention and Protocol
require." Busby, supra note 14, at 31.
267. The Swiss representative explained that his government
wished to reserve the right in quite exceptional circumstances to expel an undesirable alien, even if
he was unable to proceed to a country other than the one from which he had fled, since the Federal
Government might easily find itself so placed that there was no other means of getting rid of an
alien who had seriously compromised himself.
U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees & Stateless Persons, 2nd Sess., 40th mtg. at 32, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/SR.40 (1950) (statement of Mr. Schurch).
268. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (1998).
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appraisal of risk. The simple fact of a relevant conviction is a bar to
consideration for asylum. The gravity of this departure from international
legal standards has been heightened by the enactment of regulations which
dictate the application of the bar whenever an individual has committed an
"aggravated felony," now defined to include many minor or non-violent
offenses, for example theft or burglary, illegal gambling, fraud or deceit, tax
evasion, or falsely making or altering a passport.2 69 Many of these crimes
could not reasonably be argued even to meet Article l(F)(b)'s "serious"
standard, much less the "particularly serious" threshold set for refoulement
under Article 33(2).270
Whether or not large numbers of refugees are presently barred from
consideration for asylum by application of either of these domestic rules, the
mere fact of their existence demonstrates the inaccuracy of the assumption
that the domestic asylum process can be relied upon to deliver to Convention
refugees all the rights due to them under international law. Relying on the
Supreme Court's insistence that access to asylum is a strictly discretionary
matter, the Attorney General now enjoys the right to define bars to asylum not
predicated on a failure to meet the Convention refugee definition. In at least
the two instances discussed above, eligibility bars operate in practice to sever
the presumed linkage between satisfaction of the Convention refugee definition and access to the rights established by Articles 2 through 34 of the
Refugee Convention.
While the United States would clearly be completely within its rights to
deny asylum (in the sense of permanent admission) to refugees on a wide
variety of domestically defined grounds, such denials breach international
law where domestic asylum is the means by which the United States
implements its duty to grant refugees the rights afforded them under the
terms of the Refugee Convention. For asylum to be relied upon as the
implicit mechanism for implementation of U.S. obligations under international law, every Convention refugee must also be granted asylum. This is not
the case under American law.
VH.

CONCLUSION

Why re-visit the Supreme Court's rulings in Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca?
In part, our concern is simply that these judgments are so legally flawed that
269. The sentence actually imposed or that may be imposed determines whether an offense is an
aggravated felony; time actually served is irrelevant. A sentence of one year or more for theft or burglary,
for example, makes the crime an aggravated felony. An applicant who has been convicted of one or more

aggravated felonies with an aggregate sentence of five or more years is considered to have committed a
particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of deportation. See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's
AsYLUM PRIMER: A PRAcncAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDuRE 70 (1998) (particularly
Appendix 7C).

270. "In the present context.., a 'serious' crime must be a capital crime or a very grave punishable
act. Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences are not grounds for exclusion under Article I(F)(b)
even if technically referred to as 'crimes' in the penal law of the country concerned." UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 21, 155.
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they should not be allowed to stand. More importantly, because these
decisions define the basic approach of the United States to implementation of
international refugee law, American asylum jurisprudence has developed in
something of a legal vacuum. We regret that U.S. refugee caselaw is of
marginal influence abroad, and that American asylum decisions are rarely
informed by the experience of other state parties to the Refugee Convention.
But most critically, we argue the need to confront the errors in Stevic and
Cardoza-Fonseca because failure to do so creates real risks for genuine
refugees. While it was once possible to rely on a nearly automatic linkage
between refugee status and access to asylum under U.S. law as a practical
antidote to the Supreme Court's mistakes, that linkage is now severed. The
authority of the Attorney General to set statutory bars on access to asylum for
reasons not authorized by the Convention and Protocol means that it can no
longer be assumed that the United States will, albeit in its own idiosyncratic
way, ultimately live up to its international legal duties.
There is therefore a legal and ethical imperative to concede the Supreme
Court's foundational errors, and to correct them. It is time for a clear
recognition that refugees are refugees, that is, that there are no gradations of
status or entitlement among them; and that all refugees under the authority of
the United States are entitled to all Convention rights, not just those rights
which the Attorney General may choose to extend. Within the contours of
this clear international legal framework, the United States may validly devise
whatever policies it views as best able to reconcile the needs of refugees to
the legitimate interests of the American communities that will receive them.
But refugee rights are not negotiable.

